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 INTRODUCTION
Chairman
Restitution or compensation to the victims of crime is one of the most
ancient of all penological principles. The earliest codiﬁed laws of many
peoples are principally complex systems regulating compensation to victims.
The way in which, as the criminal law developed over past centuries,
the rights and interests of the victims of crime came to be neglected and
ignored is clearly set out in Dr Stephen Sehafer’s Restitution to Victims of '
Crime (1960). As Schafer puts it “After the Middle Ages, restitution, kept
apart from punishment, seems to have been degraded. The victim became
the Cinderella of the criminal law”.
The position of the victim at the end Of the nineteenth century was
described in an ironic statement by Adolph Prins who was both head of
Belgian Plison Administration and Professor of Criminal Law at Brussells
University. Addressing the 1895 Paris Prison Congress, he said:
J [he guilty man lodged, fed, clothed, warmed, lighted, entertained at
the expense of the State, in a model cell, issued from it with a sum
_ of money lawfully earned, has paid his debt to society: he can set his
victims ,at defiance. But the victim has his consolation: he can think
~that by the taxes he pays to the Treasury, he has contributed toward
the paternal care which has guarded the criminal during his stay in
prison
It has been suggested, that in our time, criminologists and penal
reformers have contributed to the neglect of the victim by concentrating
attention on the criminal and ignoring those who have been harmed or
' injured by them. However that may be, the renewal of interest in the rights
‘ of the victim was in fact largely due to criminological pioneers like Raffaele
Garofalo (1852—1934) and Enrico Ferri (1856—1929).
Garofalo raised the subject at the 3rd International Prison Congress in
' Rome in 1895. It was, he said “one of the most important problems in
? penal legislation”. Yet despite discussions‘and resolutions at international
congresses year, after year» little practical progress was achieved. More'
recently the development of victim compensation schemes owes more to the
. persistent efforts of English penal reformer Margery Fry, author of Arms of
‘ the Law (1951) than to any other person. But although latterly there has
been some progress there is still no country in the world where the victim
enjoys certain expectation of full restitution for the injury or damage done
to him
It may well be that for a number of reasons, some of which are .
touched on in this volume of the Proceedings such an ideal situation will-
' never be attained. But we can certainly never.return to the situation where
the punishment of crime was regarded as the concern of the state while the
injurious result of the crime was treated as a private matter. ,
{1‘1
. s
I» am glad that the Institute of Criminology devoted a seminar _to this
topic and was 'able to stimulate the production of the interesting and
valuable papers. reprinted here. It would be invidious for me to single out
individual contributions for particular praise} I am happy however to
commend them collectively; ' '
V
 
{J
 
RESTITUTION AND COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME
AS APPLICABLE TO NEWSOUTH WALES
L. K. Downs,
Under Secretary of Justice
Introduction
Prior to -the. Oiminal Injuries Compensation Act, 1967, which
commenced in New South Wales on 1st January, 1968, the Oimes Act,
1900, authorized the courts, on the conviction of an offender, to make an
order for the payment by the offender to any aggrieved person of
compensation for (a) personal injury, and/or (b) property loss sustained by
reason of the commission of the offence
Ii
. If the offender was dealt with on indictiment, the court, pursuant to
.s. 437 of the Oimes Act, 1900, could make an order for the payment of
compensation up to $2,000 (now $4,000) Under s. 554 (3) a court of
summary jurisdiction could make an award up to $300 (now $600).
' Although the power to award compensation has been in existence for many
years, the courts had seldom used it, probably because the only source
from which the fruits of such an order could 'come was the property of the
offender and such orders were generally of little or no avail.
The Oiminal Injuries Compensation ‘Act, 1967, is . legislative
' recognition of the principle that public funds should compensate innocent. ‘ '
victims of crimes of violence. The prinCiple' of the Act is that the Crown
Underwrites orders for compensation made by the courts in relation to
personal injury only, by making payments from the Consolidated Revenue
Fund to persons who suffer bodily injury as a result of the commission of
a criminal offence.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the scheme which was
~, . introduced by the Oiminal Injuries Compensation Act, 1967, and not to
 
undertake a comparative study with other schemes, or to examine the
manner in which other schemes in other parts ,of the world operate or have
- been implemented. For the purpdses ‘of discussion, reference is made to two
schemes in operation in New South Wales. One is what will be5referred to
”as the Statutory Scheme which uses the provisions of ss. 437 and 554 of
‘ the Crimes Act, 1900. The other is an Ex Gratia Scheme which is
administered in _a similar manner to the statutory scheme.
, Statutory scheme
.-i ‘ The statutory scheme is spelt out in the Criminal Injuries
, Compensation Act 1967, and adopts the provisions of ss. 437 and 554 of
‘ the Crimes Act 1900 which empower the courts to make summary orders
.' for the payment of compensation. The Act provides a means whereby a
person who suffers personal injury as a result of the commission of ar.
' criminal offence can be compensated from funds made available from
 , 4
ConsOlidated Revenue'by the Crown. The scheme is not limited to the
payment of Compensation for injuries sustained as a result of the
" commission of certain types of offences. It embraces the whole range of
criminal offences known to the law. .
Injury under the Act, means bodily harm and includes pregnancy,
mental shock and nervous shock. Injury, for the purposes of payment of
compensation by the Crown, relates only to personal injury, and does not
include property loss. In other jurisdictions there seems to be a difference
of opinion as to what “compensation for injury" includes. In New South
Wales, a very liberal interpretation is placed on the meaning of injury. It
covers pain .and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, as well as loss of
earnings, medical expenses and other incidental expenses incurred arising out
of' the injuries received.
The main purpose of the Act is to setup machinery for the prompt
payment of a modest sum'of money to tide the victim' over a difficult
- period-when he is incapacitated or inconvenienced by reason of the injuries
' he has'received. ~ -
_ -‘ lsaacs J. in R. v. Tcherchian 90 ,WN (Pt I) 85, put it neatly when he
' Said'1' ' ‘
,The most that the court can do in considering an application of this
‘_ nature is to award the applicant something by way of compensation
‘ or solarium, not a full compensation, 'but something ‘by way of
consolation for_ his injury; I ‘ - '5 . ,
In R v. Bowen and 0rs 90 WN (pt I) 82 Reynolds J. expressed the
view that the provision for an award was one of a “very summary nature”_
for “doing some measure of justice to the victim of crime without the
delay, expense and formality of a civil action".
The monetary limits placed on, orders which may be made under'ss.
‘ 437jand 554 result in some victims» being inadequately compensated,-but it
must be. remembered that s. 437A. (2) of 'the Crimes Act, preserved the
right of the victim. to bring'ciVil proceedings against. the offender for
damages for personal injuries. .
j ‘l The following points are relevant to the making of an order by the
- Conrt-fOr compensation:—
. l'_ Where a person is_convicted of an offence, the Court, at the
1 time of conviction or, at any time thereafter, may direct the
offender ' to- ‘pay to ‘the' aggrieved person by way of
compensation, a sum not exceeding $4000 in the case of an
- indictable offence, ‘or $600 in the case of a matter dealt with
summarily. I ‘
2 Where, in passing sentence, other offences are taken into account
pursuant to the provisions of 5. 4478 of the Crimes Act, the
 5
Court -may make an order fortp'ayment of compensation up to
$4000 for injury or loss sustained by reason of the Commission
of such offences. "
3 Where. under the provisions of 's‘.‘ 556A of the Crimes Act, a
charge is dismissed, or an offender is conditionally discharged,
such orders shall have the like effect as a conviction, for the
purpose of making orders for payment of compensation under
ss. 437‘ or 554. ’ '
4 Section 4‘ of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act provides
that on acquittalor dismissal of an information, the Court, on
application by a person aggrieved by reason of the commission
of the offence, may grant a certificate stating the amount which
it the court would have directed to be paid to the aggrieved
person by way of compensation had the accused been convicted
and had an application been made for an Order under either 53.
4.37 or 554 of the Crimes/id.
5 In each of the above situations'the Crown will Onlymeet the
order for payment of compensation, where it is for' a sum in
excess of $100. " - I
b 6 In R v. Forsyrhe, 1972 NSWLR 951, it was held by the Court,
’ of Appeal that the maximum amount speciﬁed in the sections
7 which the court may award jconstitutes a limit of the
jurisdiction, and is not to. be regarded as the top of a scale. In-
other words, the amount awarded by the court must not be
regarded as some'proportion of the amount which can be
awarded in the most serious case. It was also held in the same
case that the amount 'of compensation to be awarded should not
be limited by the ability of the offender to pay.
7 In determining whether or not to make an order for the
payment of compensation, the court shall have regard to any
behaviour of -the aggrieved person which directly or indirectly ﬂ
Contributed to the injury sustained. and to such cirCumstances'as'
it considers relevant (including whet‘her~the aggrieved person is
or was a relative oftthe convicted person or was, at the time of
the commission of the offence, living with the convicted person
as a spouse or as a member ‘of the convicted person’s
household). ’ - ' a -
lt should be remembered that 'an order for the payment of
-' compensation under either 5. 437 or s. 554 may include amounts for
, personal injury,-as well as amounts' for property loss. As the Crown, under'_,
'the Criminal Injuries Compensation scheme, only underwrites the amount
payable for personal injniy, the court in making an order is required to
specify the sum, if any, to be paid by way of compensation for personal
" injury, and the, sum, if any, to be' paid by way of compensation for
' property loss. - -
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‘ Application for order. ‘
An application for an order under either section, or‘ for a certiﬁcate
under s. 4 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act is normally made at
the conclusion of the proceedings against the accused. Evidence adduced at
the hearing will have given the court some indication of the nature of the
.injuries' and the circumstances ,of the offence. At the time of the
application, further evidence may be given on such matters as pain and
suffering, the applicant’s prognosis, medical expenses, loss of wages, etc.
In practice, if a victim intends to seek some order for payment of
compensation,‘he should, before the proceedings are concluded, approach
the Clerk of the Peace, in the case of indictable proceedings, or the Police
Prosecutor, in the case of summary proceedings, indicate his desire for an
order, and supply some documentary evidence in support of his claim for
expenses, loss of wages, etc. Arrangements will then be made to‘put the
matters before the court at the conclusion of the trial without the need for
legal representation. The victim, of course, as a person aggrieved, will have a
right of audienceeither personally or by barrister or solicitor;
. Where the application is not made at the' actual hearing, the Clerk of
the Peace, where the matter is dealt with in the District Court or the
Supreme Court, or the Clerk of Petty Sessions at the‘place whereit was .
disposed of summarily, may .be asked to have an application listed. Notice
~.of‘the‘ application is to‘ be given to any person against whom an order is
sought, and the applicant or his legal representative will have the carriage of
the matter when it comes before the court.
It‘liappears that the court has no power to award costs on any such
application.‘ ‘ '
Appeals.-
'Where an offender'has appealed, or applied for leave to appeal against
a conviction or sentence, the operation of any order for payment of
compensation is suspended.
. In matters dealt with by way of indictment, pursuant to the
, provisions of s. SD of the O‘iminal Appeal Act, 1912, the Attorney-General
'may exercise a right of appeal against the inadequacy of the amount of the
order for compensation: R. v. Forsyrhe, 1972 NSWLR 951.
It seems that the victim or the person aggrieved in indictable matters,
as well as in cases dealt with summarily, has no right of appeal.
'Method of making application for payment
Application for payment of compensation by the Crown should be
made to» the Under Secretary of Justice. No formal documents are required
‘ in‘ submitting the application except, in appropriate cases, the certificate
issued by the Court pursuant to the provisions of s. 4 of the Criminal
E
 . 7 ‘
Injuries Compensation Act‘in cases where there hasbeen an acquittal ordismissal of the change against the accused.
The applicant is asked to furnish a statutory declaration setting out-—
1 details of all hospital and medical expenses incurred by reasonof the injury, and the name of the hospital where treated, if
applicable; "
2 whether or not the claimant is or was a member of a hospital,
medical or other benefit fund or society;
-3 details of any amounts which the claimant has received or will
receive from medical or hospital fund recoupments, so'cial service" payments, workers’ compensation payments, personal accident' insurance, part payments by the offender, etc;
4 whether or not the claimant has obtained a certificate from theClerk of the Peace Specifying the direction of the court and the
amount required to be paid by the offender, and whether or not
the claimant has filed this certificate in the District Court at
.p’ ,Sydney;
5 whether or not the claimant intends to pursue any remedies he
may have against the offender in relation to the enforcement of
the payment of the amount of the court's direction; and
6 whether or not the claimant has received any other amounts, or
would he, if he had exhausted all, relevant rights of action and
other legal remedies available to him, receive, independently of
the Oiminal Injuries Compensation Act, any other amounts by
reason of the injury to which the application relates.
Administrative action
'The foregoing information is required to enable the necessaryadministrative action to proceed.
An aggrieved person in whose favour an order for compensation hasbeen made, or to whom a certiﬁcate under s. 4 of the criminal InjuriesCompensation Act has been issued makes application to the Under Secretarvof Justice for payment from. the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the sumdirected to be paid or specified in the certificate.
t Section 5 (1) of the Act requires the [Under Secretary to furnish astatement to the Treasurer setting forth particulars of the application andspecifying -— .
(a) the sum directed to be paid to the applicant as compensation,
or the sum specified in the certificate;‘and,
 (b) any amounts which, in the opinion of the Under Secretary, the
applicant has received, or would, if he had exhausted all relevant
rights of action and other legal remedies available to him,
receive, independently of the Act, by reason of the injury to
which the application relates. .
Section 6 of the Act authorizes the Under Secretary to defer furnishing
the statement to the Treasurer for as long as he considers it necessary to
do so, to enable him to 'specify in the statement the amounts referred to in
(b) above. In ascertaining these amounts enquiries are made as to payments
made by or recoverable from hospital and medical benefit funds and
friendly societies; sick leave payments received from employing authorities;
social service payments';-workers' compensation payments, amounts receivable
‘ for personal accident insurance; etc., as well as amounts received from the
offender. ' ' '
Where the Treasurer, after receiving the Under Secretary’s statement
considers that in the circumstances of the case the making of a payment to
the applicant is justiﬁed (and since the commencement of the statutory
scheme, no payment has been refused by_ the Treasurer), the Treasurer may
make a payment not exceeding the amount directed to be paid or the
amount specified in the certificate.
Section 5, (2) of the Criminal Injuries Cbmpensation Act, 1967, was
amended: by the Crimes and Other Acts (Amendment) Act 1974, to give
the Treasurer a discretion to disregard all or any of the amounts referred to
above, that is, the amounts which the Under Secretary identiﬁes pursuant
to s. 5(1) (b). '
Prior to the 1974 amendment the Treasurer could pay no more than
anfamourit equal to the'difference between the amount of the Court’s order
or -the certiﬁcate, and the amounts identified by the Under Secretary in his,
statement. This was found, at times, to operate harshly against applicants and
the rigid provisions were relaxed to enable the Treasurer to exercise his
discretion in favour of the victim in appropriate cases.
It is proper also, of course, for the Under Secretary pursuant to the
provisions of s. 5 (2A) of. the Act, introduced in 1974, in the light of his
investigation'__ of the circumstances, to make a recommendation to the
Treasurer that all or any of the amounts ascertained pursuant to s. 5 (I) (b)
be disregarded.
Section 5 (28) of theAct declares that any payment by the Treasurer.
shall, be made ex gratia and not as of right. In the administration of the
Act 7it was found that some health and benefit funds and similar
organizations adopted the attitude of declining payment of benefits to
which applicants were otherwise entitled while they had what was regarded
as a statutory right of recovery from Consolidated Revenue.
 
 .q ,
When the Treasurer’s approval of payment is forthcoming. and before
payment; the applicant is required to sign a Deed of Release in favour of
the Crown,
(3) accepting the sum approved by the Treasurer in full satisfaction
of any actions or demands against the Crown;
(b) releasing the Crown from any claims which the applicant may‘
have; -
(c) agreeing to inform the Crown of the receipt of any moneys
received independently of the Criminal Injuries Ctmrpeusatiun
Act 1967, by reason of the injury to which the application is
related; and
(d) to pay to the Crown upon demand, to the extent cf the
amount paid from Consolidated Revenue, any amount received
by the applicant independently _of the Act, by reason of the
. injury to which the application is related.
When forwarding the Deed of Release the applicant is also required to
furnish a statement —
(a) advising what moneys, if any, he has received in respect of the
injuries to which the application relates, and ,
(b) formally acknowledging that he has agreed to inform the Under
Secretary of any amounts he receives in the future.
Recovery action against the offender.
It has been argued that compensation to the victim of a c1iminal
injury is not effective it it consists me1eI'y of financial remedy supplied by
the State and that it should- take the form ot punitive restitution There
are critics oi the principle of victim compensation by the State, but most
jurisdictions subscribe to the view that the offender should carry the
ultimate burden of restitution.
Prior to the Crimes-12ml Other Acts (Amendment) Act I974 which
amended the (,timinal Injuries clmrpensarion Act [96 7. where a payment
had been made from the Consolidated Revenue Fund the C1own was
subrogared to the extent of the payment, to all the nghts and remedies of
the aggrieved person against the offender. Thus, the payment of any money.
under the Act did not relieve the offender of his liability under the Court
order. The liability became. a liability to the Crown, to the extent of the
payment from Consolidated Revenue, rather than a liability to the aggrieved
person. . .
in cases where part only of an award for compensation was paid from‘
Consolidated Revenue, the Crown had certain difficulties in exercising its 1
right of subrogation to seek reimbursement from the offender. For
it
l0
enforcement purposes every direction under s. 437 was required to be filed
.in the office of the Prothonotary pursuant to the provisions of s. 457 of
the Crimes Act. The order, was not divisible and the view was held that to
enforce it in toto it was necessary to obtain the consent of the aggrieved
person. in respect of the balance of the award.
The new 5. 7 of the Giminal Injuries Compensation Act spells out a
new procedure for enforcement against the offender.
Where payment is made from Consolidated Revenue to an aggrieved
person— '
(a) the Clerk of ,the Peace 'is to be advised of the particulars,
including the date and amount;
(b) the Clerk of the Peace shall endorse on any certificatevunder s.
457 (l) of the Crimes Act the date and amount of 'such
payment, and may alsoissue a certiﬁcate to the Under Secretary
so endorsed,
(c) the Under secretary may file the certiﬁcate so issued in the
. District Court, Sydney, and the registrar shall enter judgment in
favour of the Under Secretary against the offender in the
amount paid from Consolidated Revenue;
(d) the aggrieved person may also file in the District Court, Sydney,
- . a certificate issued to him under s. 457 (l) of the Crimes Act
(as amended in 1974), and the registrar shall enter judgment in
faVOUl'. of the aggrieved _ person against the offender for the
balance of the amount outstanding.
Where judgment is entered in favour of an aggrieved person before
any payment is made from Consolidated Revenue, provision is made for a
notice to be filed in the District Court, and the registrar shall reduce the
amount of the judgment by the amount speciﬁed in the notice, and enter
judgment in favour of the Under Secretary for the amount paid from
Consolidated Revenue.
The foregoing enforcement provisions relate only to directions given
under s. 437 of the Crimes Act.
. Where a direction is given for the payment of compensation under s.
554 of the Crimes Act, the section provides its own means of enforcement.
Any such direction is deemed to be a conviction or order whereby a sum
of money is adjudged to be paid within the meaning of» the Justices Act
1902, and in default of payment by the offender he is ordered to undergo
default imprisonment. Upon non-payment a warrant of commitment may be
issued for his detention.  
 II
The following schedule gives details of payments from Consolidated
Revenue in respect of both the Statutory'Scheme and the Ex Gratia
Scheme, since they commenced on lst January, 1968:
SCHEDULE
Payments from Consolidated Revenue
 
Year , Statutory Scheme Ex Gratia Sch'eme
no. amount ($) no. amount ($)
1968 ' nil . n11, nil nil
{1969 5 4,865.02 nil 1 nil
1970 , 33 14,919.11 7 . 6,583.90
197 l 24 22,095.61 3 3,200.00
1972 31 31,379.84 ‘ 8 ' 6,860.60
1973 1 54‘ ~ 62,924.14, . 21 13,231.39;
1974 . 95 108,303.01 37 _ 34,176.10
1975 (to 30.6.75) 48 88,094.70 21 15,337.67
TOTAL 290 332,581.43 97 70,339.66 _
‘ Average payment $1,146.83 $817.93 I. .
The schemes do not apply in respect of compensation for injuries
sustained through, or by reason of, offences committed before the lst
January, 1968, which was the commencing date of the Act.
it was not until the beginning of 1969 that payrhents were
made under the Statutory Scheme, and the beginning of 1970 that
payments were made under the Ex Gratia Scheme. Apart from the build--up
of, cases in the early years of the schemes, the trend has pointed to a
gradual increase in the number and total payments from year to year. It is
interesting to note that the averagepayine‘nt .over the period to 30th June,
1975, under the Statutory Schemewas $1,146.83, and under the Ex Gratia
Scheme was $817.93.
‘The limits of jurisdiction for awards 'of $2,000 in respect of
indictable offences, and $300 in respect of summary offences, were
increased respectively to $4,000 and $600 from 2nd August, 1974. In view
of the short period during which the increases were operative, it is not
believed that they had any great bearing on the average payments
made under the schemes. ' ~
For those who are interested, circumstances in individual cases and.
amounts paid to aggrieved persons are contained in the annual publication
called Outline prepared by the New South Wales Department of the
Attorney--General and of Justice -
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Administrative action after payment.
Following payment from Consolidated Revenue, the offender, whether
he is in custody or at large, is notiﬁed accordingly, and informed of his
obligation under the Court’s order. The offender is informed that the Under
Secretary is empowered and required to pursue remedies for recovery of the
amounts made available from Consolidated Revenue.
Where the offender is at large, active follow-up action is taken to
ascertain his means and his ability to pay. If he is under supervision by
probation officers or parole officers, their assistance and advice is sought.
Where the offender is in custody, efforts aremade to ascertain the offender’s
ability to pay. In almost all cases, however, the offenders are without
means and, in these circumstances, further action is deferred until just prior
to release frorri‘ prison.
In a number of cases, as can be imagined, because of the hopelessness
of the offender’s financial position, it has been necessary to write-off many
amounts as irrecoverable. Recovery is naturally slow and time-consuming. It
falls considerably short of » full restitution but this result was not
unexpected. i think it fair to say that it was anticipated.
I From the commencement of the scheme on lst January,'l968, to
30th June, 1975, a total amount of $15,006.69 has been recovered from"
Offenders and has been paid to Consolidated Revenue. Eleven offenders have
paid in full. Forty-nine offenders are now paying by instalments ormaking
periodic payments. An unidentiﬁed number of debts have been written off
as irrécOverable, and the balance of cases are under action or have been
deferred until immediately prior to the release of the offender from prison.
Ex Gratia Scheme
Anyone injured as a result of a criminal offence for which no person
has been brought to trial may apply to the Under Secretary for an ex
graria payment in respect of his injuries. The Ex Gratia Scheme is
administered by the Attorney—General and the Treasurer. The provisions of
« the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1967, do not apply, but
applications are dealt with in a manner analagous to claims under the Act.
The principal requirements to be established are—-
(a) there must be clear evidence that a criminal offence has
occurred; ' -
(b) , the offence must be one, which would probably have induced a
. . . judge or magistrate to make a direction under ss. 437 or 554,
had a person been tried and convicted, and the maximum
amounts payable under those sections will also apply to ex
gratia payments;
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(c) no payment will be made it~ it appears that any such direction
would not have exceeded one hundred dollars:
'(d) regard .is had to the matters indicated in s. -l.i'/ (.i) and s. SS-l(5). especially any behaviour-not the aggrieved person which
directly or indirectly contributed to the injury sustained by him.
h As claims of this nature are not normally considered by a court, thebilll§ lies initially and heavily on the applicant" to justify the making of a ‘payment. This will be particularly important where, as is frequently thecase, the only evidence of the incident is the applicant’s uncorroboratedaccount. ‘
When an application is made under the Ex Gratia Scheme, theapplicant is requested to supply, in the form of a statutory declaration, fulldetails of the incident giving rise to the injuries, together with the namesand addresses of any witnesses or persons who can offer any corroboration,as Well as particulars of expenses and losses incurred by him. Evidence ofexpenses and losses is to be supported by receipts and statements. inappropriate cases, a medical report showing the applicant’s prognosis is also_ obtained.
The matter is referred to the Commissioner of :Police for investigation.and report as to the circumstances ofthe case, for information as, to anyoffence that has been committed, the likelihood of an'arrest, and otherrelevant information. The failure of I the applicant to report thecircumstances promptly to the police not only creates doubts about thebona fides of the claim, but' reduces the likelihood of the offender beingapprehended.
Upon receipt of all the reports, the Attorney-General considers thematter and may make a recommendation to the Treasurer.
From time to time, situations arise where it is apparent that anapplication falls within the policy of the legislation but, for some technicalreason, the Court is prevented from making an order. In this type of case.the Ex Gratia Scheme can be utilised to ensure that the applicant receivescompensation. The following examples serve to illustrate:
1 Section 4 of the Oiminal Injuries Compensation Act applies
only where there has been an acquittal or dismissal of an
information. In a recent case, the presiding judge held that a‘
verdict of not guilty, by reason of mental illness, _did not, amount
to an acquittal, and'thathe had no power to grant a certificate
under s. 4. In this case an ex gratia. payment wassubsequently
made to the aggrieved person. g ' j
2 it seems that the section does not; cover the situation where a
magistrate, at the conclusion of committal proceedings, is of the
Opinion the accused ought not be put upon his trial and
discharges him. This would appear_to be an appropriate case for
an ex gratia payment. . ' .
 3 Where, in proceedings in the Children’s Court, the provisions of
s. 83 of the Child Welfare Act 1939, preclude the making of an
, appropriate Order under the Crimes Act, the Ex Gratia Scheme
is available to ensure that aggrieved persons are not thereby
prejudiced.
Conclusion
In concluding the paper, perhaps it would be appropriate to make one
or two observations about the operation of the schemes, and criticisms of
the schemes‘which have been made from time to time. '
It has been said that the relatively small number of applications has
been brought about by inadequate publicity of the schemes. I think it is
well to” remember that the vast majority of crime is directed against
property rather than the person, and the schemes do not make any
provision for property loss in New South Wales.
In addition to publicity by the media when awards for compensation
are made by’the courts, the Department publishes Information Bulletins
from time to time, with~a wide circulation giving details about the schemes,
and it is the practice of the Attorney-General to issue an annual press
_ statement highlighting particulars of payments made throughout the year.
, Payments to aggrieved persons are not made as promptly as they
might be. Much of this delay is attributable to the victims themselves, who
make their applications some considerable time after awards are made or, in
other cases, have to go to the Court to seek an order on which the
payment can be made. Experience shows that, in many cases, some delay
operates to the benefit of the victim, as he is in then a better position to
ascertain precisely what his expenses and losses are.
Some criticism is directed to the use of the judicial system to
determine amounts for compensation. This criticism seems to be advanced
on two grounds. First, it results in a delay in making a payment to the
victim, and secondly, it may prejudice or jeopardize the accused’s right to a
fair trial. The first ground has some substance. In most cases, however,
some delay operates to the advantage ofﬂthe victim to enable him to
determine the extent of his expenses, but in any event, the victim, if he is
incapacitated for any length 'of time, is- almost invariably eligible for social
service, beneﬁts. The second ground has no substance in New South Wales.
Awards for compensation -are determined summarily at the conclusion of
the trial and, in jury matters, without necessarily any knowledge of the
jury. The fact that the victim has the opportunity of presenting additional
facts to the Court in support of an application for an order for
compensation should- give the arrangement greater credibility and public
acceptance;
From a practical point of view,_ the two schemes appear to be'operating satisfactorily and efficiently in New South Wales with very littleadministrative cost to the taxpayer.  
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. PRESENTATION OF PAPER
, ‘ L. K. Downs
It is my intention to talk about my paper in general terms and to
emphasize the principal features of the Schemes for compensation for
victims of crime in New South Wales. The paper discusses the schemes
Mlle“ were introduced in New South Wales. and which commenced on lst
January, 1968. . _ _
I was not asked to discuss the philosophy behind State sponsored
compensation schemes, or to undertake a comparative study with other
schemes, or, again, to examine the manner in which other schemes in other
parts of the world operate or have been implemented. These, of course, are
Llengthy studies in themselves.
My paper refers to two schemes. One is what we call the Statutory
Scheme which is spelt out in the Criminal Injuries CompenSation Act 1967,
as amended. The other is what is 'called the Ex Gratia Scheme. The .
principles and theory of each scheme. are similar, but, of course, they each - ‘
operate in a slightly different way.~ . - V -
The underlying principle of the Criminal injuries Compensation Act is
that the Crown underwrites orders for-payment of compensation made by
the Courts for personal injuries. ' ""
There are a number of important factors to be kept in mind in
relation to the New South Wales Schemes; ,
1. Unlike. some other schemes, the schemes in New South Wales are
not limited to the payment of compensation for injuries
sustained as a result of the commission of certain types of
offences. The two schemes embrace the whole range of criminal
offences known to the law, including statutory offences.
2. The Crown will only meet orders for payment of compensation
,for personal injuries. It will be remembered that in making
orders for the payment of compensation under s; 437 or s. 554.
of the Crimes Act, the court-is required to specify the sum, 'if
any, to be paid by way of compensation for personal injury,
and the sum, if any, to be paid-f by way of compensation for
property loss. The Crown, then, will only pickup the tab in
'relation to the compensation for personal injury. The victim is
left to himself to follow up recovery of the amount ordered for
property loss. . ‘ .
3. The Crown will only meet expenses for personal injuries which.
arise out of the commission of a criminal offence. This situation
only arises in dealing with exvgratia claims. We have had claims
where the victim has received his injuries accidentally, and no
criminal offence has been committed. I will refer to this later
on.
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4. A very liberal interpretation is placed on the meaning of
“injury". Under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act,_injury
is deﬁned as meaning bodily harm, and includes pregnancy,
mental shock and nervous shock.
We regard it as covering pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of
life, as well as loss of earnings, medical expenses and other
incidental expenses incurred arising out of the injuries received.
5«.‘ ' A point which i have not emphasized as much as I should have
- in the paper is the fact that compensation awarded in these
circumstances is not intended to be a full compensation to the
victim. The Act sets up machinery for the prompt payment of a
modést sum of money to tide the victim over a difficult period
when he is incapacitated or inconvenienced by reason of the
injuries he has received.
(See pagc4.‘ quotations from lsaacs J. in R v..Tcherchian 90
WN (pt 1) 85 and Reynolds J. in R v. Bowen & 0rs 90 WN
(ptl) 82.) .
'6.‘ ‘An order for the payment of compensation under s. 437 of the
Oimes Act shall 'not affect the right to bring civil proceedings,
but 5. 437A spells out certain requirements where an order is
made for compensation under s. 437, and a verdict for civil
damages is subsequently obtained.
The paper lists seven points which are relevant to the making of an
order by the court, describes the method of making application, and the
administrative action taken on receipt of an application. The routine
information which is sought from the applicant on statutory declaration is
also set out. '
Details of hospital and medical expenses incurred and amounts
reimbursed from hospital, medical or other benefit fund or society are
necessary to enable a determination to be made, pursuant to 3. 5(1) (b) of
the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, of amounts which the applicant has
received. -
. In this way‘ it freQuently happens that the victim does not recover
from Consolidated Revenue, the full amount of the court’s order for
compensation for personal injuries. The victim is not prejudiced because he
has received reimbursement from a hospital, medical or other beneﬁt fund;
and he is" left with the right to recover the balance from the offender, in
the ‘same way as he may enforce payment of an order against the offender
for property loss. '
in no instance since the Statutory Scheme has commenced has the
"Treasurer refused to‘ make a payment, and I cannot envisage a situation
where the Treasurer would refuse payment where the amount remains
unpaid by the offender. 4 ’
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Section 5 (2B) of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act; declares that
any payment by the Treasurer shall be made ex gratin and not as ofrrglit.
In the administration of the Act it was found that some problems arose in
relation to contributions by the Commonwealth to hospital and medical
beneﬁts funds under the National Health Act; and to payments under the
Social Services Act for sickness beneﬁts.
Certain rights of reimbursement are~given under these Commonwealth
Acts to recover payments in these circumstances if the claimant has a legal
enforceable right against someone else. The Australian Government
departments took the view that they could recover or withhold payment
where an amount was to be paid by the State under the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Act.
We have had a good deal of correspondence with the Commonwealth
departments even at Premier, Prime Minister level about this and in respect
of Social Services sickness benefits the Commonwealth has now indicated
that the di5cretionary provisions of s. 115 (1A) of the Social, Services Act
will be applied to ensure that these benefits will not be recovered from
payments under the Oiminal Injuries Compensation Act so that they have
waived their right to insist on payment either from the claimant or from
New South Wales Consolidated Revenue for reimbursement for payments
they have made in respect of Social Services sickness benefits.
In so far as medical! hospital and nursing home beneﬁts are
concerned, the Commonwealth has now advised that with respect to cases
involving compensation payments under .therAct, that is our Criminal
Injuries Compensation Act, that have arisen in past months. provisional
Government medical, hospital, as well as‘nu'rsing home benefits are being
approved on a case by case basis. These provisional benefit payments are
recoverable if the claimant receives any compensation payment including
that from the perpetrator of the crime in respect of the medical, hospital
or nursing home expenses incurred. '
That does not leave it in my view in a very satisfactory state of
affairs or did not leave it in a very satisfactory state of affairs, but I think
with the amendment now identifying these payments as ex gratia payments
it might solve the problems.
We still have one further problem of a similar nature that has not
been resolved. It is in relation to another Commonwealth Act called The
Compensation (Australian Government lz'mployecs) Act l97l. in this case
the claimant was an employee of the Reserve Bank of Australia. He was
assaulted on his way home from work. The accused was acquitted but the
claimant got a certiﬁcate under s. 4 of the Oiminal Injuries Compensation
Act Specifying $1.100 damages. ‘
As an employee of the Reserve Bank the claimant was paid under the
provisions of that Commonwealth Act, The Compensation (Australian
Government Employees) Act 1971. He was paid all his medical expenses of
$566.46. He was also paid all his salary while he was on sick leave, namely
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$270.63, making a total of $837.09. Pursuant ’to s. 99 of the
Commonwealth Act the Reserve Bank came to us and said they wanted us
to reimburse them for the $837.09. We would prefer to let the
Commonwealth pay that money' rather than the State Consolidated Revenue
and we 'are still having, correspondence on the question of whether they
- have a right to claim it ‘or whether we have a right to refuse it.
They are the kinds of problems that have arisen in the administration
. of the Act and I think legislation identifying these payments as ex gratia
j payments will relieve us of any legal liability to make these payments over~ to these other organizations.
. . ‘Recovery action by the Crown is a slow and time-consuming process.When a. payment is made to the victim, the offender, whether he is in
custody or not, is informed of the‘amount and asked what arrangements he
can make for payment.
In relation to offenders at large, active steps are taken to recover the
amounts outstanding. They are invited to make payments by instalments,
- and the assistance of the parole officers is sought in honouring these
undertakings. ,
Where the offender is in custody, he‘is invariably not in a position to
make any payments, and. the ‘matter is reviewed immediately prior to his
release. ‘
' Up, to 30th June, 1975, a total amount of $15,006.69 had been
recovered from offenders and has been paid to Consolidated Revenue. At a‘ very rough guess 1 would say that this amount would just about cover the
administrative cost for staff and other items in administering the schemes
since they commenced. ' ' '
Statistics show that eleven offenders have paid in full. Forty-nine
offenders are now paying by instalments or making periodic payments, andan unidentified number (not large) of debts have been written off as
irrecoverable. . In some cases the offenders have died and in others they have
no means.
The schedule of payments shown in the paper indicates the extent to
which the schemes have developed since they came into operation.
, There has been a constant increase in' the number and the amount ofthe payments. For the first six months of this year,"payments for both, schemes have totalled more than $103,000. If _ this trend continues,Consolidated Revenue looks like having to provide more than $200,000 this
calendar year. ‘ '
, ‘lt issinteresting to note that the average payment under the StatutoryScheme. was $1,146.83 and the average payment under the Ex GratiaScheme'was $817.93. -
l‘)
Concerning the Ex Gratia Scheme, 1 would like to add a fifth matter
to the four principal requirements listed (p. 13):
(e) An almost invariable prerequisite to a successful ex gratia 'claim
is that the claimant should have reported the matter to the
police without delay, to enable enquiries to get under way with a
view to apprehending the offender. Police experience shows that
the longer the delay ‘in reporting a crime, the less likelihood
there is of detecting or apprehending the offender.
The biggest problem in dealing with ex gratia claims is to. arrive
at a reasonable amount for pain and suffering. The departmental practice
is to ascertain the outof-pocket expenses, such as loss of wages,
hospital and medical payments less' recoupments, etc. Then a conference is
held of senior officers to determine what is regarded as a proper amount to
be added to the out-of-pocket expenses, for pain and suffering.
Brief details of all successful clairns‘ are contained in the departmental
publication titled Outline. i thought, as a matter of interest, I should give
you some particulars of recent ex gratia claims which have been
unsuccessful. '
Case I _ we
, Victim claimed he was seriously assaulted, but not robbed in Woomera
Avenue, Kings Cross. Had previous convictions for false pretences and
valueless cheques. Had given three different accounts of the- event. Facts
given to the Department and to the police varied. Apparently a claim for
Workers‘ Compensation was unsuccessful, Seemed to be in financial
difficulties and was endeavouring to ‘use the possibility of a successful
claim as security for a loan from'a Bank. Firm of solicitors had filed an
irrevocable authority signed by the victim authorizing the Department to
pay $500 to them of the proceeds of his_claim. To cap it all, he made an
approach to the Ombudsman and gave him 'the third different account of
theevent. I do not know what view the Ombudsman took of the complaint
but he informed the victim that all matters he had advanced had been
considered by the' Attorney-General and in accordance with the provisions
of his Act he had no power to conduct 'any formal investigation into
reasons for refusal of ex gratia payments.
Case 2
Victim claimed he was assaulted by three or four unknown persons on
2nd July, [970 in William Street, Kings Cross. Police officer reported that _
on visiting St Vincent’s Hospital on 8th July, 1970 the victim spoke to him
of the alleged assault. The victim had difﬁculty in communicating the
details, but was asked to contact the police on his discharge from hospital.
' Enquiries made by the police in the vicinity at the time proved fruitless.
Failed to contact police and his whereabouts became unknown. Almost 4
years later, he made a claim for an ex gratia payment. Had a lengthy
criminal record. Unable to substantiate some claims in relation to
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employment. An aged pensioner and suffered no out-of—pocket expenses.
Claim was rejected by the former. Attorney-General. The solicitors, on
behalf of the victim renewedtheir representations again this year and in
writing to the local member of Parliament said, “You recall that we
attempted, from the earlier Attorney-General, to get an order for damages.
Now that Mr Maddison has taken the post it may be worthwhile to try
again”.
Case 3
Spinster, aged 61 years, at 9 pm. on a Saturday night on the corner
of Park and Elizabeth Streets, Sydney, was bumped by a pedestrian coming
in the opposite direction and fell to the footpath severely injuring her hip
and required extensive hospital treatment. The claimant stated no other
pedestrians in‘the vicinity at the time and no attempt was made to steal
either a handbag or a carrying bag she was carrying at the time. Enquired
about a payment under the Ex Gratia Scheme 3% months after the event,
and reported the matter to the police 41/2 months after the event.-
Sorne doubts existed about the bona ﬁdes of the claimant’s story and
the Attorney-General was‘ not satisﬁed that a criminal offence had been
committed. ~ ,. ‘
Case‘ 4
Claimant had a lengthy criminal record. Following an argument he was
shot in the left hip and the offender was charged with malicious wounding.
Victim subsequently went to Melbourne. On a number of occasions he
refused to attend court in Sydney to give evidence unless the police would
guarantee his immediate return to Victoria following the case. He was
wanted on a first instance warrant for “break enter and steal” in this State.
On the indictable proceedings against the offender the Attorney-General
directed that no further proceedings -be‘ taken because the victim had
refused or failed to appear as a witness to give evidence. Shortly after the
Attorney-General directed no further proceedings, the victim made an
application for an ex-graria payment.
Case 5
The victim came from Melbourne and was working as a painter and
docker in the port of Newcastle. He sustained a fractured skull. Police were
called to Newcastle Hospital by the hospital authorities. Victim refused to
give any information to the police apart from stating that he had been-
“king hit” in a Hotel at Carrington and that he would settle the matter in
Whis own way. The victim made an application 8 months after the assault
through a firm of solicitors from Melbourne for an exgratia payment.
Case'r6
Victim had been drinking in a hotel after work for about 3% hours.
V_ On his way home was accosted by three men and robbed of his wallet
containing $2 in money; In a scuffle suffered lacerations and abrasions to
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his left leg, bruising of his left shoulder and a deep laceration to his right
hand. Offenders were not apprehended. Total out-of-pocket expenses and
loss was less than $100 and the claim was refused.
Case 7
., The victim claimed he received stab wounds in Reservoir Street, Surry
Hills by an unknown assailant who, he believed, was of Maltese origin. The
Public Solicitor made a claim on his behalf. There was a delay of 15
months in reporting the matter to the police. Conflicting versions were
given as to how the incident occurred. Out-of-pocket expenses amounted
only to $28 and a further sum of $500 claimed for loss 'of wages was
apparently attributable to a subsequent visit to the hospital because of an
alcohol problem. ‘
Case 8
Victim and his girl friend commenced'drinking in a city hotel near
the Haymarket at 11 am. An argument developed with an unknown male
and the girl friend left. The victim telephoned his girl friend several days
later and said to her: “After you left, the. bloke said he wouldn’t fight me
in the hotel; '50 we went up the back lane at the market and had a fight”.
The victim sustained a fractured right tibia and fibula, a broken nose and
bruising to his chest. Has previous convictions. Matter was not reported to
the police who only became aware of it after a claim had been made to -
the Department for an ex gratia payment.
. Our experience is that a very large percentage of ex gratia claims arise
“otlt of assaults that start in or around hotel bars, where both parties are
affected by liquor.
In the concluding part of the paper I have endeavoured to answer some
of the criticism of the schemes which I have read and heard from time to
time.
It has been said that the relatively small number of applications has
been brought about by inadequate publicity of the schemes. I think it is
well to remember that the vast majority of crime is directed against
property rather than the person, and the schemes do not make any
provision for property loss in New South'Wales. 4
Another significant limiting factor is that the schemes will only meet
. , claims when compensation in excess of $100 is involved. There are many
= criminal assaults and muggings of various kinds committed from time to
, ‘time, and while they instil fear into the minds of the victims, many of
p' them may not result in very serious bodily or personal injury.
There may be some legitimate criticism at the absence of adequate
publicity. While this could be stepped up, it seems to me that as the
number of claims under the schemes is steadily increasing, the community is
becoming more and more aware of their existence. ‘
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COMMENTARY
E. J. Shields, LLB.
'Public Defender in the State of New South Wales.
'I should like to say that the views that are expressed here are those
for which I alone must remain responsible, and in expressing these views I
am to a certain extent acting as the Devil’s Advocate in‘the hope of
stimulating discussion.
I should like to congratulate the Under Secretary of Justice, Mr
Downs. It is clear both from his paper and his exposition that he has an
active and a detailed knowledge of both schemes of compensation, and it is
of great interest to learn how they are dealt with from an administrative
point of view.
' I have divided my commentary into four essential categories:
.3 comments and‘criticisms;
0-; legal difficulties as yet unresolved;
,o administrative problems (other than those under National
‘ Compensation whichis the subject of the paper presented by my
learned 'colleague Herron); '
0 some suggestions which I would put to you.
Comments and criticisms
In dealing with this subject of compensation for criminal injury there
seems to be a tendency to overlook the fact, or to confuse the fact, that
this subject has its root in two separate Acts of Parliament.
In the first instance there is no power in any court to make any
‘orders for compensation in the criminal field without recourse primarily to
' s. 437 and s. 554 of the Oimes Act. Indeed there are many cases in whichin happier days and under benevolent judges the power contained in s. 437has been exercised as an adjunct to the granting of a deferred sentence anda recognizance, even in matters of serious crime. This Act and the Oiminrzi‘Injuries ‘. Compensation Act, 1967, operate quite separately andindependently. Indeed, in many respects in the past they have operatedvery satisfactorily in appropriate cases, where leniency is extended to an‘offender,_.i,both to see that the victim is in some way compensated and toact as a'constant reminder to the wrongdoer' by way of punishment as each“week he has to pay the award 'of compensation which is part of thecondition of his recognizance.
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True it is, as Mr Downs says, that there are many cases where,
because of the period of incarceration or the worthlessness of the prisoner
or both, the “debt" is written off and an order made under s. 437 may
therefore be of little practical value. However, we should not forget that
any such order is still the order of a court of competent jurisdiction and as
such it is intended and does create definite rights and obligations in respect
of Which at least, as Mr Downs points out, the Crown has a right of
appeal; and, subject to those of more experience than I, it may well be
that the accused also has the right of appeal '
In regard to the Oiminal Injuries Compensation Act (which for brevity
I shall refer to as the “Compensation Act”) it may well be that this is
legislative recognition of the principle that public funds should compensate
innocent victims of crime whatever the degree 'of compensation. However, it
is my submission that it is usually an Act without teeth. No enforceable
orders are made under it by courts of competent jurisdiction and the
provisions of s. 3 and s. 4 thereof merely. give the person who is either the
recipient of an order pursuant to s. 3 of the “Compensation Act”(and that
is an order under s. 437 of the Oimes Act or of a certificate under s. 4 of
the “Compensation Act” the right to make an application to the Under
Secretary for payment to him of the sum speciﬁed. Section 5 of the
“Compensation Act” gives the Treasurer the discretion to make a payment
in the terms thereof, if he so desires.
It is indeed interesting to note that no application has been refused
thus far. In my respectful submission the .right to refuse all or any
applications rests upon executive decision notwithstanding the best efforts in
this regard of Her Majesty‘s judges. Indeed, the quotation from R v.
Tcherchian 90 WN (pt 1) 85 of his Honour Mr Justice Isaacs “to award the
applicant something by way of compensation" and the quotation from R v.
Bowen and Ors. 90 WN (pt I) 82.by his Honour Mr Justice Reynolds “for
doing some measure of justice to thelvictim of crime”, and, indeed, the
whole decision in R v. Forsythe 1972 NSWLR 951 would all indicate, in
my respectful submission, that there is a sense of inadequacy in the Oimes
Act in the way in which it approaches thisproblem of criminal injuries and
compensation therefrdm.
Indeed, it is hard to see why someone who receives a stab wound in,
the course of a robberyfrom which he eventually recovers without any
apparent permanent disability should be in a better position than the
connoisseur who has stolen from him a priceless relic, which not only leaves
- him very much poorer, but he is left to suffer the mental pangs of
outrageous fortune into the future unaided by any compensation under the
“Compensation Act”. One cannot help but wonder why it is that an
applicant who is armed with an order of the Supreme Court or a District
‘ Court should then have to furnish a statutory declaration. in relation to the
various matters Mr Downs has set forth at a time when he will already
doubtless on oath have sworn to many of the matters there required of him
by the administration. One can but wonder why, upon the Treasurer’s
approval of some payment, a “Deed of Release" in favour of ~ the Crown
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should be necessary in the terms as indicated or indeed, at all. For surely it
must be a primary principle that if the Crown is not responsible for the
acts of its own servants, it certainly cannot be made responsible for the
' acts of its own citizens.
Although one can see the necessity for an undertaking to advise when
moneys are received or to be received and as and when they are received,
there does not seem to be any legislative fiat for either of these
requirements and this again, in my submission, points to inadequacies in the
“Compensation Act". One can well appreciate the two schemes as outlined
by Mr Downs, but a close examination of the Statutory Scheme brings it
back basically to an ultimate ex gratia payment scheme for which there is
some legislative authority. Notwithstanding this it would appear that the Ex
Gratia Scheme. has co-existed with the Statutory Scheme since 1970. One
could be excused for wondering why it is that such a worthy motive as is
embodied in the Ex Gratia Scheme has not itself by now been embodied in
- the amended “Compensation Acti' properly drawn. Might I, with respect,
then submit that the ‘co-existence of the Ex Gratia Scheme only serves to
highlight my submission that no person who receives an order under s. 437
or s.' ,554 of the Oimes Act, or a certificate under s. 4 of the
“Compensation Act", has any right to receive the amount set out therein
from the Crown other than ex gratia. notwithstanding what has obviously
been thus far an outstanding record on the part of the existing
administration. However,»administration and policies change, and we are well
aware that economic stringencies can play a vital part in that change and in
_ that administration. ‘
Legal difﬁculties as yet unresolved
l have neither the time nor is it appropriate in terms of my
commentary to refer to all the law on this subject, but instead would refer
you to the excellent article in 48 AL] pp 428—433 by Professor W. T.
Westling (then lecturer in Law at the Faculty of Law in the University of
Sydney, currently at the University of Oregon School of Law), where many
of the problems and authorities which have been collected in the Australian
'States are set out.
Might 1 however take the liberty of drawing your attention to some
important matters which, in my respectful submission, require authoritative
determination. Firstly, who is an “aggrieved person” within the meaning of
s. 437 of the Oimes Act? This question raises its head particularly in
murder cases such as in R v. McCafferty' & Ors No 2 1974 NSWLR 475
where ‘an application was made by a widow on behalf of herself and each
of her three daughters for an order under that section. His Honour Mr
Justice Glass, Judge of Appeal, in a single judgment, held that his View of
the scope of the section effectively excluded dependants of victims from
the class of aggrieved persons for the reasons detailed and set out therein
after reference to the decision of Mr Justice Reynolds and Mr Justice lsaacs
in Bowen and Tcherchian’s cases. It can be suggested that both Mr Justice
Reynolds and Mr Justice lsaacs, with great respect to them, in those cases
were not deciding that further evidence or arguments were inadmissible, and
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, to the extent that his Honour Mr Justice Glass relied upon those remarks
‘ from their Honours he had allowed himself to fall into error. However,
whether this be the case or not, it is my respectful submission that the
object of s. 437 of the Oimes Act was the compensation for injuries of
victims of crime, and even in the extended definition of injury the inclusion
of the reference to pregnancy obviously related to the victims themselves of
crimes til" a sexual nature exclusively. This, coupled with the reasons given
by his Honour Mr Justice Glass, in my view, constitutes the rational
interpretation of the section, and it doesnot seem to allow aggrieved
persons to include dependants who may have suffered nervous shock from
the death of a relative. To decide otherwise would be to open the
- ﬂoodgates for a large number of claims from a number of sections of this
community, not the least of which might well be distraught mothers who
suffer a similar condition on hearing of the rape of their daughters or a
dozen other persons who because of their relationship suffer a nervous
shock. ' ~ .
However, the matter does not seem to rest with McCafferty. His
:Honour Mr Justice Slattery, in a matter of Baxter at Grifﬁth (Supreme
Court, last year, unreported), decided that a widow who witnessed the
savage attack on her late husband thereby suffered an injury and was an
‘ aggrieved person entitled to the maximum award of $2,000 then applicable. .
., His Honour in his judgment appeared to place a great deal of weight on the
fact that the applicant herself witnessed the attack or a substantial portion
of the attack on her late husband. His Honour in that_judgment was not
referred to McCafferty nor does he discuss the applicant’s entitlement in
~- more detail in a legal sense than I have merely summarized here. With great
 
' respect to his Honour and the high esteem in which I hold him,~ it is my
submission that this approach is either wrong or it is distinguishable upon the
:ground that the applicant in fact witnessed the savage and: cruel murder.
Again his Honour, the late Judge Donovan, in the Court of Quarter
Sessions in Penrith on the 15th May, 1973, made an order in the matter of
Linguist, the pilot who had a forced landing in Warragamba Dam. His
’ Honour made an order in the sum of $2,000 which he held was the
maximum which‘may be awarded in respect of any one indictment, and
would not make an award in relation to the second count and the second
., death in favour of the widow, there being a father and son involved in that.
'JHere again his Honour gave no reasons, and with great respect to his ‘
Honour, he was, in my submission, in error, both as to the order he made
in relation to the limitation he placed upon the counts and in making the
. order itself.
4 It would seem that the question of multiple victims and of a claim in
“.respect' of more than one count in an indictment which concerned his
Honour Judge Donovan has been authoritatively decided by his Honour
Mr Justice Isaacs in Tcherchr‘an's case. This problem is at present under
consideration by his Honour the Chief Judge at Common Law, in relation
4 to four applications against each of, the prisoners, Baker and Crump, and his
Honour’s decision there will add either strength to the decision of his
Honour Mr Justice Class or, if to the contrary, it is hoped if this be the
_case the CroWn will see fit to ensure that this matter is decided
authoritatively for this State in the Court of Criminal Appeal.
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. The crimes and Other Acts (Amendment) Act 1974 increased the.
amount payable under s. 437 from $2,000 to $4,000. There are doubtless
still cases in existence in which the offence occurred before 2nd August,
1974, but the case was tried thereafter and the application heard thereafter.
Doubtless also, this figure will be amended from time to time by thelegislature. It is my submission that an amendment such as this goes to thejurisdiction of the court and as such is a matter of substantive law and notmerely procedural, and in this regard I would refer you to Maxwell V.
Murphy 96 CLR p 261 and what his Honour Mr Justice Barton said in
Hedderwick v. Federal Commissioner of Land Taxes 16 CLR pp 39—42.
Indeed, I see no distinction between an amendment to the Crimes Act in s.437 or s. 554 in operation and an amendment to the District Court Act(N.S.W.) and Workers Compensation Act where, from time to time,the'
jurisdiction is increased.
Mr Downs has referred to the decision by a presiding judge that anacquittal on the ground of mental illness did not give him the power togrant a certificate under s. 4 of the “Compensation Act”. In a matter of'Lesnewski heard at Newcastle on the\9th July this year, his Honour MrJustice Rath, upon such an acquittal, granted a certificate and held that thequestion of whether the accused was the offender within the meaning ofthat section (s. 4) would have to await another day, and it seems to me’ that each of these pronouncements has something which is left to be' decided on some other day. It seems to me also that 8.4 of the“Compensation Act” contains a contradiction in its terms in that it relatesto the position of an acquittal or a dismissal and at the same time refers toan‘application by a person, aggrieved “by reason of the commission of theoffence”. Surely if there has been an acquittal or a dismissal there has beenno commission of any offence. In my view those words should be amendedto read “by reason of the commission of the acts which are alleged toconstitute the offence". Furthermore since the amendment of s. 7 of thatAct, a person acquitted on the ground of mental illness, automatism, selfdefence, accident, consent, even identity, might well be considered to be anoffender against whom the Under Secretary might enter judgment bysubrogation under that section without right of appeal on the part of theacquitted accused. A person acquitted on ' any of the groundsabo‘vementioned, particularly mental illness, could not be said to be anoffender or a convicted person and steps should in my view be taken to see‘ that this class of person is protected by the Act in this regard.
Administrative problems
.As Mr Downs very properly points out in his paper there is no power ‘to make. an order'for legal costs on any such application. Indeed anapplicant proposing to apply to a court, if he follows the directions he canobtain from the Clerk of' the Peace as set out in Mr Downs’ paper, couldnot require to be represented unless some serious problem at law, such as lhave mentioned above, arises. As a matter of practice whilst CrownProsecutors assist the court in their traditional function they generally adoptthe view, and I believe quite correctly, that they should not be associatedwith an application for compensation unless requested by the court. It has
1.x:
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always seemed wrong to me that a person who obtained an order for
compensation should have to pay $300 or $400 out of it for his legal
,representatives and even harsher where. in even lesser claims, he recovers
$200 or $300 only subject to a charge for legal expenses. It is, therefore,
’ my submission that the Act should provide that either no costs should be
payable at all or that the. Treasurer invan appropriately difficult case might
pay some fee fixed by regulation and beyond which no costs will be paid.
I have noticed from the booklet Outline which Mr Downs refers to
that in the lower and medium range of awards there appears to be, and one
can only go here on the very short statement of facts in those case
hiStories, a lack of consistency and a disparity. This is understandable with
so many different indges ,bringing their minds to bear upon perhaps
”imperfect and improperly presented cases. One wonders whether some type
of graduated award, similar to that of the workers compensation system
would not be desirable. I appreciate that that system operates on so much
for a finger, so much for an‘eye, etc., but perhaps concentrated thought
could work out some system of a graduated scale of payments under this
Act. It also seems to me that under the present system those who” fall
within the lower to medium award bracket under the scheme have more
chance of getting an adequate compensation for'their injuries than those
persons whose claims take them beyond the statutory limit, and that in this
regard there is an inbuilt imbalance in the Act
, -. Having regard to Tcherchian's case ,an accused person is at a
disadvantage in fully deciding the extent of 'the injuries suffered by the
victim. He may well be ill-advised to embark upon this during the course of
the trial, as to do so might only aggravate his own position and he is
certainly ill-equipped to deal with. the situation in the way in which it
would normally be done in a civil aetion for damages. The accused in these
circumstances is at a distinct disadvantage in relation to applications for
orders for compensation both tactically and legally.
The National Compensation Bill, 1974
This bill may make a lot of the’ foregoing an academic exercise and as -
l have said my learned colleague Herron is to give us the benefit of his
knowledge on this detailed subject. I say nothing more than perhaps those
_who frame that legislation, if it ultimately comes to pass, may benefit from
Our experience and our mistakes.
Conclusions
Might I conclude by saying that nothing that l have said in this paper
‘ y is» intended to be critical of Mr Downs and the excellence of the paper that
he‘presented. Indeed it is certainly offered constructively. I, hope to
9220—2-
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provoke you into discussion upon these matters and I might therefore
suggest to you the following:
0 that the Crimes Act could be properly amended to more
precisely deﬁne who is and who falls within the class of an
“aggrieved person";*
0 that the question of costs or no costs on such applications be
dealt with legislatively;
o in order to clarify the situation, if Mr Downs should be correct,
that no appeal lies so far as the accused is concerned, and in
order to give the victim an additional right, the Oiminal Appeal
Act should be suitably amended to permit appeals by both
prisoners, accused persons and aggrieved persons;
0 that consideration be given to the establishment of some form
of compensation Scale in similar fashion to 5. 16 of the
Workers Compensation Act;
0 that s. 4 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1967 be
amended as l have suggested, and that s. 7 be amended in order
to protect the right of a person acquitted on the grounds of
mental illness or accident, selfdefence, lest it should be
considered that he was an offender against whom the Crown had
a right of subrogation.
In conclusion then might 1 echo the remarks of Professor W. T.
WeStling in the article that I have referred you to when he said:
The judicial doubts and inconsistencies. as to questions of ,
interpretation noted in the case law canvassed herein lead to the
cOnclust'on that the enactments in New South Wales, Queensland,
South Australia and Western Australia need reconsideration in a
number of respects; ' '
What do you - think?
‘ In relation to the problem of who is an
“aggrieved person" it does seem to me
that we have. allowed. as lawyers, our
thinking in relation to the Law Reform
illist-cllam-t'ms Provisions Act 1944 which deal
s with the question of nervous shock. and
that body of persons who are covered by th
e area of potential harm, to intrude itself
into the criminal law. It does'not, in
my submission, appear to have any jus
tification
on a reading of that Act for its inclusion in
the criminal law.-
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NATIONAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME
B. .I. Ilr'rmn
Barrister at law
In early 1973, the Australian Government appointed a Committee “to
report: upon the desirable scope and form of a nationwide system of
rehabilitation and compensation for all injured persons”. In January, 1974',
the terms of reference were extended to include sickness. Members of the
Committee were Mr Justice A. 0. Woodhouse of the New Zealand Supreme
Court, Mr Justice C. L. D. Meares and Professor T. S. Atiyah. The latter,
howeVer, remained a member of the Committee for only a short time. An
“essential part” of the Committee’s report was the National Compensation
'Bill, 1974. This bill was amended in the House of Representatives and in
October, 1974, after its introduction into the Senate, was referred to the
Senate Standing Committee of Constitutional and Legal Affairs which in
July last completed its report upon the clauses of the bill. Inallthe
controversy which has raged concerning this legislation andin all the volume
of material presented before the Woodhouse Committee, to members of
Parliament and to the Senate Committee, little seems to have been said
about compensation for the victims of crime, for which this bill not only
_ provides but concerning which it introduces a scheme which is
revolutionary. In View of the debate which has taken place in recent times,
not only in Australia, but overseas especially in the United Kingdom and
the United States (see Edelhertz and Geis: Public Compensation to Victims
of Crime 1974), it is somewhat strange that more was not said concerning
criminal compensation in the discussion of the provisions of the bill and
before the Woodhouse Committee. The Senate Committee did refer to the
matter. The majority were divided in their attitude, while Senator Wright
expressed a completely dissenting view (see Senate Report p. 91 and
Senator Wright’s addendum p. 211). Only four very short references
it seems were made to the problem in the written ,submissions
before the Senate Committee. The Social Welfare Commission however
adopted a most liberal approach (see below} and, although short, its
submissions are of great interest. Despite this apparent economy of words
the Scheme which evolved in this connection, and which of course is the
work of the Woodhouse Committee, is perhaps the most advanced ever to
be seen. ‘ -
. For the purpose of discussion a convenient starting point would be to
look, very shortly at someﬂaspects of the historical development of the
concept of compensation for criminal injuries. This, I hope, may be al
so of
some assistance in considering the bill in this regard and the philosophy
underlying its provisions for compensation for criminal injuries.
The earliest scheme is perhaps that to be found in the Babylonian
Code, about 2500 BC, in which Hammurabi provided for compensation i
n
respect of stolen goods, where the thief had escaped capture and also
for
compensation to be given to the heirs where a life was lost (see Edelh
ertz
and Geis p. 7, n. 6; Schafer Compensation and Restitution to Victims of
Gime 1970, 2nd edn p. 3 ff.). Such provisions may, of course, have been
designed more to encourage trade and commerce rather than to provide
~
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victim compensation, but anthropologists suggest that even in preliterate
societies a similar interest in placating the victim and in deterring crime was
the rationale behind the almost universal provision for payment of moneys
or goods by the family of an offender to those injured by violence, the
presumption being that without such payment unrest would lead to
constant vendettas (see J. A. MacCulloch “Crimes and Punishments —
Primitive and Savage” Vol 4 Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics p. 552).
The Old Testament provides us with a fairly simple compensation scheme
whereby if a man is injured by another with a stone or fist, he is entitled
to be compensated for his loss during partial incapacity by the other man,
but note, only after the victim has got up out of his bed (Exodus 21
v18—19). The ancient Greeks and Romans, as well as the Germanic tribes,
adopted criminal compensation measures (see Schafer p. 8 ff), while a scale
reminiscent of that provided for in 5.16 of the New South Wales Workers'
Compensation 'Act is found in Ethelbert’s decrees, established in the lifetime
of St Augustine (see Marjorie Fry Arms of the Law 1951 p. 31) —- a thumb,
for example, attracted the payment of 20 shillings, a thumbnail 3 shillings,
a forefinger 9 shillings and the ring finger 6 shillings. Maitland wrote of
Anglo-Saxon and early Norman times: ‘The sons of avillanus who had but
two often must be under some temptation to wish their father would get
himself killed by a solvent theyn.’ (Doomsday Book and Beyond p. 44.)
One might say that the wife of a criminal guilty of ill-treating her (so far
as the National Compensation Bill is concerned) would be tempted to wish
him commit a crime (and be killed in doing so) or be murdered,
particularly if she was an A class widow.
Schafer comments: “After the Middle Ages restitution, kept apart
from punishment, seems to have been degraded. The victim became the
Cinderella of the Criminal Law" (ibid. p. 8). From that time the State
gradually took over the exclusive right to bring offenders to justice and “the
victims had to obtain their satisfaction for being injured from the
punishment meted out to the doer by the courts, according to penalties
built into the various penal laws or sections of the penal code, although
there were some provisions in criminal and civil courts for the victim to
claim indemnity for the injury done him.” (Reckless The Crime Problem
1973 5th edn p. 103.)
It is only in recent times that fresh attention has been. drawn to the
plight of the victim of crime and there seems no doubt that reformers have
had to fight the attitude exhibited in the criminal law which puts the
interests of society, in ensuring criminals are punished, far above the
interests of the victim (see Chappell ‘Providing for Victims of Crime:
Political Placebos or Progressive Programmes?’ December 1972 Adelaide Law
Review 299). During the last 10 years, however, there has been an
increasing interest and concern in the problems of crime in Australia.
Statistics have even been produced in an attempt “to obtain some empirical
measure of the amount of fear and concern about crime in this country”
(see the statistics produced by P. R. Wilson and .l. W. Brown in their Crime
in the Community 1973). These figures certainly indicate an existing disquiet
even though the survey was confined to Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane and a
rural area. This uneasiness may, of course, be related to questions affecting
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the protection and maintenance of property rather than the safety of the
individual, but one cannot help thinking that the constant emphasis,
particularly in the popular press, upon the growing incidence of violent
crime, has focused attention upon the needs of victims. Edelliertz and Geis
suggest that “fundamentally, programmes designed to compensate persons
injured by crimes of violence are attempts to placate a public opinion often
utmétVed and resentful of what is viewed as' a rising tide of aggressive
activity" (ibid. p. 4). The scheme under discussion, however, is founded
upon the notion that “the modern needs and reasonable aspirations of
disadvantaged citizens should be met” (see below).
The New Zealand Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1963 introduced
what was probably the first comprehensive national scheme in the world to
‘provide for compensation for those injured by violent crime. The Crimes
Compensation Tribunal set up under that Act assesses compensation on a
basis comparable to Workers Compensation (see Harris “Compensation for
Victims of Crimes of Violence” A.G. Davis Essays in Law 1965 p. 45).
An upper limit is imposed however and a time limitation of 6 years
applies to the receipt of the major benefits: ,,ss. 18 and 19. The hope that
victim compensation in New Zealand .would become absorbed into a
universal accident compensation scheme has only been partly realized, if it
has been realized at all. The 1974 amendment to -the Accident
Compensation Act, 1972 introduced 5. 1053 into the principal Act and
personal injuries resulting from some crirriinal activity are covered by the
Scheme. The victim only is covered'and the crimes are conﬁned to rape (s.
128 Crimes Act 1961); sexual intercourse with a girl under 16 (s. 132
Oimes Act) and wilfully producing a disease in another (s. 201 Crimes Act).
. The New Zealand scheme which commenced on lst January, 1964,
found its basis in the various inquiries which had been conducted in the
United States (Harris, ibidl. These inquiries were preliminary to the
introduction of the United Kingdom Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme
in March, 1964. The .Home Office Working Party’s Report ‘Compensatio
n
for Victims of Crimes of Violence' 1961, Cmnd. 1406, The Conservati
ve
Party’s Report. of July 1962 ‘Victims of Violence’,a report of a non-par
ty
group ~Calling itself “Justice” chaired by the Earl of Longford and the White
Paper entitled “Compensation for Victims of Crimes of Violence” Cmnd
,
2323 are perhaps the most important documents in this regard. There'seem
s
no doubt that these inquiries and the ideas which they produced, as inde
ed
similar inquiries elsewhere, were “clearly attributable to
the work of
Marjorie Fry” (see Edelhertz and Geis at p. 10; Harris, ibid. p. 45 n.2;
Morris and Hawkins The Honest Politician’s Guide to Oime Control p
. 43).
In her book published in 1951 Aims of the Law, Marjorie Fry has said:
“the tendency of English criminal law in the past has been to ‘take it out
on the offender’ rather than do justice to the offended” (p. .125). This,
however, was in the context of crimes against property and minor ones
at
that. In 1957, in an article in The Observer, she proposed the establishmen
t
of a limited system of governmental compensation for victims of
criminal
violence. The problem was seen by her as being one of an assa
ilant not
being able to pay adequate compensation and she quoted the case
of a man
blinded as the result of an assault in 1951 and awarded compensation
of
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£11,500. His two attackers, she said, had been ordered to pay 5 shillings per
week and this meant that the victim would have to live another 442 years
to collect the last instalment. “A bitter mockery! Have we no better help
to offer to victims of violent crime?” This article is reproduced in
‘Compensation for Victims of Criminal Violence. A Round Table’ Vol. 8
Journai of Public Law p. 191 ff. “In our modern system". she continued.
“of collective responsibility for sickness and injury, we have evolved the
machinery for assuring compensation which could well be extended to
injuries criminally caused, affording equal benefits to the man who falls
from a ladder at work and the man whose enemy pushes the ladder from
under him at home”. For her, modern finance was supported by the sharing
of risks of almost every kind and she observed that “this principle of
clubbing together for mutual protection was venerable in British social life”.
Quoting Bentham she said “Punishment, which, if it goes beyond the limit
of necessity, is a pure evil, has been scattered with a prodigal hand
Satisfaction, which is purely a good, has been dealt out with evident
parsimony?’Bentham, further, was of the opinion that “satisfaction should
be drawn from the offender’s property”, but “if the offender is without
prdperty . . . it ought to be furnished out of. the public treasury, because it
is an object of public good and the security of all is interested in it.” (see
John Bowering Ed The Works of Jeremy Bentham Edinburgh Vol I p.
386)
In Professor Atiyah’s view, discussions which led up to the
establishment of the United Kingdom scheme revealed “an extraordinary
intellectual confusion” (see Atiyah Accidents Compensation and the Law,
1970)., The Home Office Working Party, for example, rejected the
proposition “that ‘the State has a duty to protect its members from
unlawful violence and that if it fails to do so it should pay compensation”
as being “both fallacious and dangerous" (see para 17 of Working Paper).
Although there was “no constitutional or social principle on which State
compensation could be justiﬁed” (ibid. para 18), the party thought that “it
could nevertheless be based on the more practical ground . . . that although
the welfare state helps the victims of many kinds of misfortune, it does
nothing for the victims of crimes of violence as such, notwithstanding that
they are largely deprived of the means of self-protection and in most cases
have no effective remedy at law.” “There is an argument (it held) for filling
this gap, based mainly on considerations of sympathy for the innocent
victim, but falling short of the acceptance of any bounden duty to mitigate
the victim’s hardship.” This was thought to be an argument “more likely to
appeal to the public than any more abstruse principles that might be
formulated” (ibid. para 18).
Professor Rupert Cross in an article in The Listener in 1963,
expressed the view that “if there is a widely recognised hardship, and if that
hardship can be chiefly remedied by State compensation, I should have
thought that the case for such a remedy was made out, provided the
practical difficulties are not too great The hardship in these cases is
undoubtedly widely recognised” (see “Compensating Victims of Violence” 49
The Listener 816 16th May, 1963).
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The United Kingdom scheme provides for compensation to persons
who have sustained personal injury directly attributable toa crime of
violence, which includes arson and poisoning, or to circumstances surrounding
the arrest of an offender, the attempted prevention of .an offence, the
giving of aid to a constable in certain circumstances: see para 5 of the
scheme as consolidated in 1969. Strangely enough, this scheme has not been
set tip by statute. The authority of the.Criminal injuries Compensation
Board is derived “from instructions by the Executive Government, that is,
by prerogative act of the Crown”. (see Diplock L. J. in R. v. Criminal
Injuries Compensation Board [1967] 2 QB 864 at 883), and although awards
of compensation are made ex gratia and not as of right, the proceedings of
the Criminal Compensation Board are subject to the supervision of the
courts (ibid..). Compensation awarded under the scheme, however, is,
“ generally speaking, assessed in the same way as damages are assessed by the
courts, subject, however, to its being shown that the loss comes above
certain limits (see Atiyah p. 335; Edelhertz and Geis p. 2l3 ff; also second
circular of United Kingdom Royal Commission on Civil Liberty and
Compensation for Personal Injury para 20).
. Interest in victim compensation in the United States appears to have
been based upon whathad transpired in New Zealand and the United
Kingdom (see Edelhertz and Geis p. 12). Likewise it seems that their
inﬂuence was great in the introduction of the various schemes in the
Australian States.
The New South Wales Criminal Compensation Act 1967, which was
first in the field, introduced a system of guaranteeing the payment out‘of
Consolidated Revenue of amounts ordered to be paid by a convicted person
under s. 427 or s. 554 (ii) of the Crimes Act. The “guarantee” was limited
to $2,000 but this has since been increased to $4,000. This provision,
however, with its limitation as to the amount of the order, is “of a very
summary nature of doing some measure of justice to the victim of a crime
without the delay, expense and formality of a civil action, for example,
assault, trespass or conversion.” (per Reynolds J. in R. v. Bowen 90 WN
(N.S.W.) 82 at 84). “The most that a court can do (under this scheme) in
considering an application of this nature is to award the applicant
something by way of compensation or solatium, not a full compensation
but something by way of consolation for his injury” (per Isaacs J..in R v.
Tcherchian 90 WN (N.S.W.) pt. I 85 at 90). It is to be noted that ex gratia
payments of compensation will be made to victims of unsolved crimes
(statement of the Attorney General quoted by Chappell: “Emergence’of
Australian Schemes to Compensate Victims of, Crime” reproduced in
Chappell and Wilson The Australian Criminal Justice System p. 771 at 777).
The New South Wales scheme and those of the other States do not grant
compensation as a matter of right, nor has any special tribunal been set up
to administer them. The injured person (with the exception of the case of
the unsolved crime) is forced, in effect, to pursue his claim at the trial of
the person accused of causing his injuries.(in,this connection see Chappell,
ibid. at p. 780 ff). The main difficulty with these schemes lies in the fact
that compensation is strictly limited. In Tcherchian"s case, for example, the
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accused was convicted of wounding with intent to murder for which he was
sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. The victim had been attacked with a
“long razor” and was disfigured “in a ghastly fashion in the face” and
“required over a hundred stitches”'(ibrli. p. 88). The judge’s assessment that
the .victim would probably have recovered an amount in excess of $10,000
at Common Law was probably a conservative one. This criticism, of course,
raises the question of ﬁnance. The Premier of South Australia, Mr Dunstan,
in ”relation to the level of compensation stated in a letter to Dr Chappell
(ibid. 782 n. 37); “The problem in this State 'has been twofold. Firstly, the
.stringent position of this State’s finance at the moment in the Social
Service sphere, and secondly, were this State to implement-a scheme to
compensate such victims, the amount paid by the State would preclude the
victim from claiming Social Security benefits from the Australian
Government. Until we get an agreement with the Commonwealth concerning
Social Service benefits, I do not think that we can make much progress".
The dilemma confronting the States, as Dr Chappell pointed out, is that in
making payment to crime victims direct from revenue, they are in effect
subsidizing the Federal Social Welfare programme.
In 1970, Dr Chappell expressed the hope that: “In the speculative
future it is conceivable that the States and CoMonwealth may reach
formal agreement about a uniform compensation scheme for Australia as a
whole” and he saw theemergence of such an agreement as being related to
“a more controversial reform”, namely, provision for a uniform criminal
code,. the natural extension of which would be a Criminal Injuries
Compensation Scheme but pending this “Australian victims of crime will
probably have to remain content with a number of separate and limited
compensation schemes” (ibid.). When these observations were made, the
scheme for compensating victims of crime which is part of the 1974 bill
was obviously completely beyond his contemplation.
This bill was designed to give effect to the purpose of the Woodhouse
Committee’s report which was “concerned with the responsibility of society
for the injured and the sick.” “Its theme is their need for automatic
rehabilitation and compensation — without tags and without discrimination.
The recommendation is for generous earnings-related compensation at every
level of income up to $26,000 per annum” (para I of the Report of the
National Committee of Inquiry, “Compensation and Rehabilitation in
Australia”: The Woodhouse Report). The present Social Services system,
which was seen as aiming “merely at an income for subsistence", was to'
be replaced, as was the Common Law action for damages and the various
Workers’ Compensation schemes. “Social problems in the past (said the
Woodhouse Committee) have been handled in a piecemeal fashion. But
half-measures and compromise are quite incapable of meeting the modern
needs and reasonable aspirations of disadvantaged citizens. The obligations
of the community should be thought through from first principles. The
Report attempts to provide that analysis. It proposes a new deal for every
Australian whose life has been disrupted or damaged by injury or disease”
(ibid.). In the House of Representatives the Committee’s bill was amended,
no doubt to meet the criticism that it did not in fact provide income-related
benefits except in reSpect of total incapacity. In October, 1974, the Senate
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referred the bill to its Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairsand in July, 1975 that Committee completed its report. It was attracted “tomany of the principles and aims of the bill". it concluded that the compensationsystems were random in their coverage and provided inadequatecompensation. It was also concerned “that compensation for injuries iseffectively limited to work-caused injuries suffered by employees, to someVltllﬁts of criminal acts and to those victims of highway accidents who canéSlﬁblish fault” (report 12]). The Committee saw the need for goverrunentassistance in the injury compensation area in any event and felt, in effect,that it was now the appropriate time to consider new approaches “to theprovision of more equitable and comprehensive coverage at the lowestDOSSible cost” (1.22). The Committee was of the view, furthermore, “that, ifa comprehensive and fair system of compensation having constitutionalvalidity became available either through this or some other scheme then theremoval of the common law action for negligence with respect to work androad injuries would be justified” but it thought a right of action should bereserVed in respect of breach of statutory duty, strict liability situations and“some special causes of action” (2.29). The bill purports to remove allcommon law rights (clause 97). The Senate Committee received advice fromthree senior counsel that this provision was ultra vires the legislative powerof the Commonwealth (3.4). It however lies at the very foundation of thescheme because if no common law remedy is available then there is all themore reason for a comprehensive cover ' for all injuries resulting inincapacity, including those received by the victims of crime. Despite“significant deficiencies” and constitutional problems, the Committeerecommends that the bill be withdrawn. and reconsidered in accordance withits recommendations, but these is no way depart from the essential aims ofthe Woodhouse Committee. If the Government did not so act and withdrawthe bill “the recommendations would be appropriate to consider in thecommittee stages” (1.23; 1.24).
At the time of writing it appears that the Government will proceed
with the injury part of the scheme at least, but whether any or all of the
Senate Committee’s recommendations are to be adopted is not known. For
the present purposes therefore I shall refer 'to the present provisions of the
bill. The Woodhouse Committee’s aim was “to provide for all members of
every family during the 24 hours of every day” (para 374f, p. 169) and
the bill provides a universal and comprehensive system to compensate all
Australians who are totally or partially incapacitated through injury or
sickness and who are totally or partially incapacitated, permanently or
temporarily. The beneﬁts, moreover, are not confined merely to those
suffering injury or sickness in Australia; Members of the defence force,
persons formerly resident in Australia but.- who are outside Australia in‘
connection with their employment or who are ’students (provided that
' , immediately before the injury they intended to return to and reside in
Australia within a reasonable time after the conclusion of their activities)
are entitled. Dependants of such persons are also covered, as are persons
who have suffered personal injury outside Australia before the expiration of
1 year after their ceasing such employment or study overseas or after they
have ceased to be resident in Australia (see clause 16). It therefore follows
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that an Australian tourist injured as the result of a “mugging” in Central
Park, New York, would be covered, and no doubt the dependants of the
Australian Irishman killed recently in Northern Ireland would likewise be
entitled to receive appropriate compensation (if the scheme had been in
force).
It is not intended to enter into any detailed discussion in relation to
the calculation and amounts of compensation appropriate in any given case
but I shall attempt a short outline. In respect of incapacity which is
determined to be total and in the first instance that is to be determined by
the Secretary of the Department 85 pe.r cent of the person’s weekly
income, which he derived immediately prior to his incapacity, is payable
' (clause 40). A person committing a crime which is not excluded by clause
13 and is injured in committing that crime would be entitled to receive -
during total incapacity 85 per cent of his weekly income. Division 2 of part
5 of the bill provides various methods of assessment of “weekly income”.
In respect of permanent partial incapacity, the bill departs from the
income-earning principle and a formula determines the amount of benefit
by multiplying 85 per cent of the Commonwealth Statistician‘s current
average weekly earnings-by “the percentage of the person’s incapacity” and
that the Woodhouse Committee felt was a simple matter by importing into
the scheme the American Medical Association’s guide to the evaluation of
permanent impairment which consists of a schedule or schedule type
publication .which puts values on incapacities and injuries. It has been
maintained that this latter publication was never meant to be used as a
basis for compensation in the manner spelt out in the bill but this really
relates to a discussion. of this provision in relation to the beneﬁts to which
an appreciable number of persons in the community are now entitled under
the law. The strict application of this provision could, it' seems, result in
hardship, although the Secretary is given a discretion to increase the benefit
in an individual case (clause 36) (a provision which, however, came under
criticism from the Senate Committee [Report 8.21; 8.22] ). Death benefits
covering funeral, children’s and ’relatives’ benefits are provided for (see
claus’es 46—48). Generally, a death benefit is payable to a child amounting
, to 3/20ths of the benefit which the deceased would have received if he had
been totally incapacitated before his death. but if both parents have died it
is 6/20ths of that am0unt. In relation to relatives, the assessment is to be
made on principles analagous but not identical to those applied in the
assessment of damages under the Compensation to Relatives Act (see clause
48). The benefit may be a lump sum unlimited in amount or may be a
weekly sum at such rate per week as the secretary determines (see clause
48). Perhaps one of the most controversial aspects of the scheme is that
with regard to widows pensions. Widows, however, do not come within
these provisions and are separately provided for under part 6 of the bill
which is headed “Widows Pension". Widows are divided into “A" class and
“B” class. Class “A” widows are those maintaining a home for a child or
aged or infirm person or unable to engage in gainful employment, or who
becamewidowed after attaining the age of 55 years. All other widows are
in cIass“B”. The bill proposes a lump sum payment of $1,000 in each case.
While class “A” widows, however, are to receive the $1,000 plus 3/5ths of
8.5 per cent of the husband’s earnings prior to his death, class “B” widows
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are to receive in addition to the $1,000 a pension at the rate of an “A”
class widow but only for a period of 12 months or until the-date of
remarriage. Also, in the case of remarriage of an “A” class widow, a benefit
equivalent to one year’s weekly payments is made and no further pension
will be payable (see clause 57 ff, and the Senate Committee’s comments at
11.1 ff). Clause 51 provides for compensation not exceeding $10,000 in
respect of disfigurement (the sum mentioned strangely enough in
Tcherchian’s case). Clause 54 provides for lump sum payments in certain
cases.
Apart from death, however, “incapacity" is the matter which is
subject to compensation. “incapacity” is deﬁned as being. “in
relation to a person, incapacity means the impairment of (a) the ability of
that person to engage in work that is useful or gainful; or (b) the well-
being of that person” (clause 4). Furthermore it is incapacity as a result of
personal injury (clause 16). (For the purposes of this discussion, sickness is
left aside). Clause 8 of the bill defines “personal injury” as “a physical or
mental injury or other physical or mental damage or effect that is caused
by an occurrence specified in, or is caused in the circumstances specified in
the schedule”. The schedule 'contains' what. the Woodhouse Committee
claimed was an exhaustive prescription of the external causes of injury
taken from the World Health Organization. publication The International
Classification of Diseases (see para 350 of the Woodhouse Report). If one
looks at the schedule which is some pages in length and 1 would have
thought covers every known accident or disease known to man one comes
to that part of the schedule which I have set out at the end of this
paragraph. Subject to certain exceptions (see clauses 10, 11 and 12 of the
bill) “physical or mental” injury or other “physical or mental damage or
effect” attracts beneﬁts under the bill if it is caused by one of the
occurrences or in one of the circumstances speciﬁed in the schedule. (It is
of some significance that the Senate Committee found that this-provision in
the bill had “merit for reasons of clarity" see 14.33) In the present
discussion, parts XVI, XVlI, XVI“ and XIX of the schedule are of the greatest
signiﬁcance. Those parts are respectively headed Suicide and Self-inﬂicted
Injury, Homicide and Injury Purposely Inﬂicted by Other Persons, Legal
Intervention and Certain Injuries whether Accidentally or Purposely
lnﬂicted.
Although mental injury is comtemplated and a person’s“‘well-being” is
considered as part of “incapacity”, it seems that, apart from disfigurement,
incapacity has to result in wage or other pecuniary loss‘ before compensation
is attracted. The mental anguish of the widow of a murdered man is not to
be compensated as such. '
A11 “injuries,” however, are otherwise included in the scheme except
those suffered in the commission or attempted commission of the crimes set
out in clause 13. Death by lawful execution is also excluded (clause 14 and
i in this case totally excluded). Clause 13 does not operate if the injury results
in death. The crimes set out in that clause are: (a) murder; (b) maliciously
or wilfully wounding or inﬂicting grievous bodily harm; (c) piracy; (d) an
act 'done with the intention of endagering a person on board a vehicle,
vessel or aircraft; or (a) revolt against the authority of the master of a ship
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or the commander of an aircraft. Reference to these specifiedcrimes
“includes a reference to a similar crime by whatever name called" (clause
13 (2)), but the “section does not have effect unless the person was
convicted of committing or of attempting to commit, the crime concerned”
'In its oral submissions to the Senate Committee (see report 2.20), the
Law Council of Australia complained that “the philosophy of this bill is
that nobody ever really deserves full compensation, but everybody should
be treated the same. We contest that philosophy . . . it does' seem
incongruous, for example, that two people involved in a pub brawl in which
one is clearly the aggressor and the other the innocent victim,shou1d be
equally compensated on the same basis—so'that the innocent victim is giving
up some of his compensation to compensate his aggressor".l suppose it
could also be said that it seems strange that the widow of a murdered
man and the widow of the murderer who is killed whilst being arrested are
to‘ be treated upon the same basis, unless of course either of them happens
to be a “B” class widow in which case the murderer‘s widow if she
happened to be an “A” class widow could well be better off. Likewise, no
' account is to be taken of the Conduct of the victim, a matter to which I
shall refer to shortly below. The ‘very basis of the Woodhouse Committee’s
report and the bill, however, was that there would be “automatic
rehabilitation and compensation — without tags and without discrimination”
and once this concept is accepted, it is difficult to exclude any incapacity
resulting from any injury except where it might be thought that public
policy just would not support it. it is further unnecessary to enter into the
debate as to whether, for example, “this kind of injury‘should be singled
out for special treatment by the State”, because the bill does notsingle it
out and merely treats victims and criminals alike and upon the same basis
‘as every other citizen in the community (cf Atiyah 324). likewise the
Question of fraudulent claims hardly arises (see Home Office Working Party
Paper 'paras 39 ff, and “Compensation for Victims of Criminal Violence”
p. 203 for a short reference to this problem). For unless the injury and
consequent incapacity is received by the injured person during the
. commission or attempted commission of the crime as set out in clause 13,
heis entitled to compensation. The type of question which one might be
tempted to ask when first confronted with a proposal to compensate
victims of crime. “Why compensate victims of crime and not a farmer, for
example, who is struck by lightning in his paddock and rendered a helpless
invalid?" (a question asked by Miller in “A Round Table” vol. 8. Journal
of Public Law p. 203) need not be asked as part 12 of the schedule to the
Act provides for accidents due to natural and environmental factors and in
particular, item 93 refers to lightning.
The Senate Committee thought that clause 13 was arbitrary in the
selection of crimes for exclusion from benefits and pointed out that it
includes murder but not manslaughter, wounding but not rape. The
Committee, whilst expressing the view that a person should not “gain from
his criminal activities”, felt that the exclusions under clauses 13 and 14 of
the bill might cause hardship to dependants of the criminal and it drew
attention to the provision of clause 115 which permits the Secretary to
suspend payment of a beneﬁt payable to a beneficiary during a period of
 39
imprisonment yet enabling payment. to a dependant of that person f
or the
whole or a portion of the benefit (see 10.26 of the Senate report).
There
was a division in the Committee, however, concerning clause 13.
Senators
Button, Everett and Crimes recommended that it be deleted from the bill.
Senators Chaney and Missen recommended that it should'be retained subj
ect
to:
(a) the provision of adequate safeguards for the right of
dependants; and (b) that a more consistent and comprehensive list of
crimes be compiled. taking into account variations in classiﬁcations,
definition and seriousness of crimes under the criminal hws of
Australia, the States and the Territories (ibid. 10.27).
Senator Wright in a dissenting view (ibid. p. 211) referred to the
recommendation of the Woodhouse Committee (para 364 (d)) that:
The line must be drawn somewhere. In New Zealand criminal
activity apart from murder does not involve exclusions from the
scheme. We do not think that approach goes far enough. In our
opinion, the answer really is that injuries received when committing
serious crimes of violence should be excluded and we have attempted
to draw and arbitary line. “
(The Committee however does not appear to have been referring to the
New Zealand Oiminal Injuries Compensation Act and see above) and “that
there should be exclusions in the .caseof persons injured while a party in
the first degree to, and subsequently‘convicted in respect of, the crimes of
murder, piracy, hijacking,_wilfully doing grievous bodily harm”. Clause 13
gave effect to these recommendations (para 364 (e)). Senator Wright,
however, felt that “there are many crimes of serious violence not speciﬁed
in the clause, for example, aggravated assault, rape, safe blowing, riot,
robbery, affray. 1f the criminal in these instances is injured, maybe
permanently, it is, to my mind monstrous for the Treasury to pay him a
beneﬁt if he is totally incapacitated equal to 85 per cent of his earnings
until he is 65, or at all." He furthermore recoiled from the idea that a
person charged with murder but found guilty of manslaughter, for example
in respect of killing a person with a shotgun, should receive a lifelong
benefit in respect of injuries received as a result of “a self-defending shot in
the eye”, or other injury. He also disapproved of the relatives and
dependants of a criminal killed in his Criminal activities receiving the same
beneﬁts as dependants of “law, abidingciti'zens". “in my view” he said, “if
provisions such as this are enacted. we will be moving, more-"rapidly
than is
desirable, to a state of affairs where crime does pay — I dissent fro
m any
view that gives compensation beneﬁts for injuries suffered in the cou
rse of
commission of serious crimes such as l have mentioned whether to the
criminal himself or his dependant-s. social Service benefits for dependants
in
cases of need is another matter” This, however, was a dissenting view .and
at least three Senators were for the abolition of the exclusion clause
altogether. In this regard the submission made by the Social Welfa
re
Commis'sion, referred to above, is of the greatest interest. With regard
to the
“non—deserving cases” referred to in clause 13, the Commission put th
e view
that the “withdrawal of government benefits should (not)
be used as a
penalty; the courts are established to decide an appropriate penalty
.” To
refuse compensation rights “as a penalty in certain circumstances
is to
impose a very discriminatory penalty and one which may not rest o
n the
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guilty person alone in any case; the family of the injured person is made to
share . the penalty. “The Government has done much to take from
administrative discretion .moral questions, which are more properly
deliberated though the courts, if anywhere. Questions of morality . . .
should not be matters of concern for social security payments” even in
non-controversial areas such as those associated with crimes of violence
where there was no controversy about the seriousness of the crime. The
CommiSSion thought that the withdrawal of compensation would have “no
. effect as, a disincentive for certain behaviour” and “strongly” recommended
the deletion of clause 13 from the bill. The law Council of Australia in its
written submission however, was obviously not of this view and complained
that so far as clause 13 was concerned “the crimes are rare crimes so that a
great scope of criminal activity or wrongdoing can produce benefits for any
injuries sustained in the course of same’’.(Its oral submissions have already
been referred to). The National Compensation Insurance Industry Committee
felt that clause 13 was “too limited” and believed that the community
would not accept “that persons injured whilst committing serious crimes
should get benefits from losses arising therefrom". It thought the list of
crimes 'should be enlarged to include “misdemeanours or other crimes
punishable by imprisonment, though the latter might include statutory
offences”. What was contemplated by this perhaps imprecise language were
serious crimes. This Committee however did not rule out beneﬁts for
dependants. The only other body to write to the Senate Committee in this
regard was the Returned Services League of Australia, which pointed out
that whereas a person who had 'been dishonourably discharged from the
services as a result of the commission of a crime would not be entitled to
,beneﬁts under the Repatriation Act, nevertheless he might be entitled to
more generous treatment under the bill.
With regard to the Social Welfare Commission’s view (and presumably
the view of Senators Button, Everett and Grimes, although the precise
reasons for their conclusion are not known) in every scheme for the
compensation of victims of crime of which I have read moral judgements
are made in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded,
whether any is to be awarded at all.
Thus in all these schemes the conduct of the applicant is taken into
account (see Edelhertz and Geis p. 270 so far as the American schemes are
concerned). Compensation may be denied or proportionately reduced.
Baroness Wootton in the'debate in the House of Lords upon the United
Kingdom scheme, however, thought that it was impossible to determine the
measure of fault of the victim. “This attempt” she said, “to assess people’s
needs after they have suffered serious and possibly permanent injury by the
question, of whether it is their fault or anybody elses fault is an illogical
and uncivilized approach to the subject" (see House of Lords Debates 257
(1964)p. 1381).
In the scheme which was established in the United Kingdom, however,
the conduct of the victim became relevant, and the Board was given the
power to reduce or deny an award by reason of the conduct of the victim
‘ in provoking or taking part in the incident in which he received injuries (see
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Fourth Report, Cmnd. 3814 (1968)
 41
para ll). In its Third Report Cmnd. 3427 para 13, the Board was troubled
by the fact that the original scheme did not call for reduced awards “to a
victim who is a man of bad character or who has previous convictions for
crimes of violence" or to other “undeserving” individuals. As a result.
paragraph 17 was introduced into the scheme in 1969. It gives the Board a
wide discretion to consider whether, because of the conduct of the victim
of the crime (before and after the offence) and his character and way of
life, it is inappropriate that he should be granted a full award or any award
at‘all (see Atiyah p. 332). “As between the victim and the offender, the
responsibility is evidently that of the offender, but between the victim and the
State, the victim’s own conduct becomes of greater importance” (ibid.) (For
a discussion of the way in which the Board applied this provision see
Atiyah p. 332 ff and Edelhertz'and Geis p. 222 ff.) One case of a rejection
by the Board is of interest (cited by Edelhertz and Geis at p. 223)
A professional housebreaker (who) . . . was disturbed by one of the
occupants of the house he had broken into. He ran away and the
householder discharged his shotgun in the general direction of the
housebreaker’s retreating figure, peppering him with shot. We did not
consider that it was appropriate that those injured whilst engaged in
criminal activities should receive an award.
‘Under the bill, of course, he would be entitled (assuming incapacity) to
compensation. The New South Wales scheme of course also directs that the
conduct of the victim is to be taken into consideration.
The bill, therefore, even with theinclusion of clause 13 makes a
substantial departure from what has generally been accepted in this field. It
may be that the contents of the proposed scheme in this regard represent a
logical extension of the Woodhouse Committee’s basic premise that all
should be covered in respect of the risk of injury 24 hours a day. This risk'
is nonetheless a risk because the injury was sustained in an incident of gang
warfare or in a drunken brawl. One American commentator (Weihofen in
“A Round Table” p. 213) suggested that a new criterion should be adopted
to determine “when a victim (or his survivors) should be eligible. The line
would be drawn at a different place from either the line dividing culpable
or non-culpable homicide, or that dividing murder from voluntary
manslaughter”. On the whole, however, Baroness Wootton’s observations are
attractive. They are applicable of course to the perpetrator as well as to the
victim of crime. On the other hand it might be difficult to obtain the
support of the man in the street for such avantgarde propositions.
The schemes in the United States. and the United Kingdom scheme
have regard to family matters and exclude from their ambit persons who
are in some way related to or living with the offender. This, according to
Professor Atiyah: p. 330, excludes asubstantia] number of cases “for there
‘is no doubt that a high proportiOn of criminal assaults is committed within
the family circle". McClintlock, (Crimes of Violence, 1963) found that as
many as 30.8 per cent -of criminal assaults were “domestic”, although he
included within this category squa bles between neighbours and not merely
assaults on members of the sam family. Apparently the reason for this
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exclusion is based upon the danger of fraudulent claims and secondly, the
undesirability of awarding compensation which might beneﬁt the offender
himself. It does not appear that these reasons are valid as far as the bill is
concerned. ‘
May I make some observations as to the administration of the scheme.
These remarks are general and apply to all claims under the bill. In relation
to criminal injuries, however, there could be problems in determining claims,
e.g., in determining whether the injuries were within the categories in the
' schedule, but as all incapacity resulting from injury is to be compensated, a
claim not coming within one part of the schedule would come within
another. The question as to whether a person is guilty of a crime (unless it
is one of the prohibited ones where he is the claimant) would not seem to
. raise the problems which appear to have arisen in the United States. There
difﬁculties have apparently arisen in relation to proving criminal intent in
order to maintain a claim for victim compensation. ln such a case the
alleged criminal may well have an interest in opposing the claim on the
basis of the stigma (and disadvantage) which could attach to him in the
event of the claim being successful (see Edelhertz and Geis p. 261). Apart
from the ex gratia payment similar problems in the administration of the
New South Wales scheme may arise as a conviction must be obtained before
compensation can be awarded.
As‘ to the actual determination of compensation the Woodhouse
Committee considered that the distribution of compensation “should not be
the, subject of contention or argument”. Furthermore, “proposals are made
that formality be kept to a minimum; that inquisitorial rather than
adverSary procedures be adopted in order to arrive at a fair and just answer
in every case; that there should be opportunity for review by an
independent tribunal of any departmental decision and that on a point of
law there should be an appeal to the courts. Wherever he might wish it,
there could be no reason for withdrawing from an applicant the right to be
represented” (para. 18). In this connection also, the Committee in dealing
with “independent appeals” (para. 421) said “An applicant should be
entitled to be represented should he so desire, whether by a member of the
legal profession or any other person". Under clause 68, the Secretary must
inform an applicant in writing of his decision, and if it is unfavourable to
the applicant, he must furnish the reasons for his decision and at the same
time inform the applicant of his appeal rights. Clause 67 provides that the
applicant then has a month to request the Secretary to reconsider the claim .
in whole or in part. If on a reconsideration the Secretary decides to dismiss
the claim, again he is required to inform the applicant in the same manner
as before. Under clause 82, an aggrieved applicant may appeal to an Appeal
Tribunal within the prescribed time. In this event, the Secretary is required
' to forward the application to the appropriate tribunal. On the grounds that
the proceedings are to be informal, there is no provision permitting an
applicant to call any evidence or to produce any witnesses who might assist
his claim. So far as the Appeal Tribunal is concerned, again the applicant
must be given the Opportunity of “being heard in person or by a person
acting on his behalf” (clause 82 (4)). Once again,however, although there is
provision for evidence being taken on oath (clause 86) the applicant has no
 43
right to call any evidence and the tribunal is directed to proceed “with as
little formality and technicality and with as much expedition as the
requirements of this Act and a proper consideration of the matters in
question before the tribunal permit" (clause 83). There is an appeal from
an Appeal Tribunal to the Superior Court of Australia (until that court is
established, the Commonwealth Industrial Court) on a question of law
(clause 92). The New South Wales Bar Association was concerned that
contested claims should be heard by judicial tribunals in much the same
way as contested claims are heard before the Workers Compensation
Commission of New South Wales. The Senate Committee has suggested that
the scheme be administered by an independent statutory commission as an
alternative to the present administrative organization. It has recommended
that Parliament give further consideration to alternative administration
methods of operating the scheme before making a final decision and so far
as' the appeal provisions are concerned; the Committee considered that
accepted standards of justice should ﬁnd a more positive expression in the
appeal provisions. of the bill (16.3). It.saw the essential requirements of a
sound and equitable appeal structure as at least involving/inter alia) the
constitution of each Appeal Tribunal on a more judicially secure basis than
is now provided in clause 71 and recommended the conferring of an express
right on an appellant to cross-examine witnesses (16.4). The Committee has
further recommended that the Appeal Tribunals established under the bill
be substituted by a special division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
The cost of all this will be considerable. Based on calculations for
1973-74, the Woodhouse.Committee “assessed the new "plateau’ cost of the
overall scheme at $1,655,000,000 per annum" (Senate Report 4.3)..The
injury part of the scheme, according to the-table appearing in that report
and produced in the Senate Report at p. 35, indicates that these provisions
will cost $325,000,000 per annum. The amendments made to the bill in the
House of Representatives will obviously increase this cost (Senate Report
4.4) and the Senate’s recommendations, if they are carried out, will further
increase the cost of the scheme. Estimates made by the Department for the
Senate Committee indicate a plateau cost of $384,000,000 being reached at
the end of sixth year in respect of the part of the scheme relating to
injuries. The cost could be ’much greater than this. The Senate Committee
“was concerned that the cost estimates in the Woodhouse Report may not
be a sufﬁciently accurate guide to a Government charged with the,
responsibility of implementing the scheme ‘on a year to 'year budgetary
basis, bearing in mind that once even (one stage of the scheme if put into
operation it must, for practical reasons, be continued in future years”. The
injury part of the scheme was, however, seen as being by far the least
costly and the Committee thought that if the Departmentallest‘imates of the
costs for the first five years were reasonably accurate “we are satisfied that
the cost can be met without any, or any significant, recourse to
Consolidated Revenue” (4.15). It was made clear to the Senate Committee
that the Government had not decided the method of financing the sche
me,
although the Woodhouse Committee recommended various levies on
employers and self-employed persons, an excise on petrol and a call upon
Consolidated Revenue to the extent of existing Social Security payments
(Senate Report 5.1). In view of the fact that there has been no indication
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as to how the scheme is to be financed, 1 am not in a position to make
any comment. Nor was the Senate Committee, except that it had much
evidence before it touching upon certain aspects of ‘the possible methods of
ﬁnancing the scheme and their effects (5.4 ff.). There would appear almost
certainly to be difficulties in financing the scheme in the manner envisaged
by the Woodhouse Committee (Senate Report 5.4).
As I have said at the time of , writing it appears that the Government
intends to go on with this legislation. If the common law remedy, for
constitutional reasons, cannot be abolished the consequent need for citizens
to insure themselves against claims at common law could well give rise to
great practical difficulties. ' .
The Senate Committee’s recommendation that actions for negligence
causing personal injury be abolished but that actions for damages based on
'wilful or intentional injury to the person and breach of statutory duty and
certain cases of strict liability be retained would further complicate matters
in this regard.' Whether this problem can be overcome (and one way would
involve the co-operation of the States) remains to be seen:
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
B. J. Herron
In my paper 1 have attempted to illustrate the revolutionary nature of
the National Compensation Scheme, which we are advised today will come
into force in part at least. It is understood that at this very moment the
Government is considering introducing the injury part of the scheme and
appropriate legislation is about to be put before Parliament.
The Senate Report, although fairly voluminous, is most informative. It
moreover shows the capacity of Parliament itself to conduct its own
detailed‘ investigations of a prdblem rather than take for granted legislation,
the form of which has been the result of f‘expert” inquiry. The Committee
sought and obtained legal opinions concerning constitutional aspects of the
scheme envisaged by the Bill. These opinions are set out in the report.
More important perhaps are the detailed views of the Senators themselves
which are set out fully. 1 recommend that you look at the report, even
though you 'may not read the‘ whole of it.'~'
With reference to the New South Wales Criminal Compensation Act
‘and to the two cases which have already been mentioned,\i.e. that of
Tcherchian and' of Bowen, in each of those cases the view seems to have
been taken by both Mr Justice Isaacs and Mr Justice Reynolds that this was
a compensatory provision. I mention this as it may be of some importance
in discussion having regard to the fact that another view has been taken of
_'sirnilar provisions in Queensland. I refer very quickly to a judgment of Mr
Justice Hangar in the case of Daley, which is referred to in an article by Dr
Chappell in the Adelaide Law Review, where his Honour referring to t
he
Queensland provision is reported as saying:
There is practically no authority under s. 6638 of the Criminal
Code under which I am acting at the moment but I state that in my
view an assessment of compensation in this matter is far different to a
civil 'award one is considering awarding damages. This award is a
punishment in addition to other punishment which has been placed on
the accused person and the Crown in the event'lof an ex gratia
payment has the right to recover against the accused person whate
ver
amount the Crown pays without limitation as to time.
It seemsrto me that this may be of some importance when' discussing the
provisions of this bill, because the bill takes no account of any theories of
retribution and it takes no account' of any matters of punishment except
that relating to the perpetrators of certain crimes which are excluded from
compensation. l have used the word “victims” of crime but so far as this
bill isconcerned victims also include the perpetrators, subject to the
exceptions found in clause 13. So that in one way the perpetrator of a
‘crime who is injured during its commission is regarded as the victim of the
crime and is entitled, subject to his not coming within those exceptions, as
being entitled to compensation. '
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. l have referred to the fact that so far as the Woodhouse Committee
was concerned, it was fundamental in their view that the no fault
compensation system would sweep away the present common law rights to
obtain damages. 1 have referred to the fact that the Senate Committee
obtained the views of counsel and it was the view of three .senior counsel
that clause 97 of the bill which seeks to abolish common law rights is
beyond the power of the Commonwealth. It is signiﬁcant however that the
Solicitor General, Mr Byers, the fourth senior counsel to render an opinion,
was of the view that this provision is within power. This is certainly not a
matter beyond debate. I again come back to the underlying philosophy of
the Woodhouse Committee that is expressed to be: '
. to provide for all members of every family during the 24
hours of every day.
The Committee thought that the great advantage given by what they
described as a protection from all the hazards and risks of the 24 hours
was an advantage which far outweighed any advantage given to victims by
the common law (whether they were motor car victims or whether they
were the victims of crime).
I would like to refer in more detail to the schedule of the Woodhouse
RepOrt (see p.37 of my paper). It is divided into columns. There are
numbers which are assigned to each class of injury but the more important
reference is to particulars of the cause of injury. For example under,
Homicide and Injury Purposely Inﬂicted by Other Persons are listed “fight,
brawl, rape” which includes brawl or fight with hands, fists, foot or killed
in ﬁght; “assault by corrosive or caustic substances except poisoning"
includes injury or death purposely caused by corrosive or caustic substance
such as burning or scalding by: acid (any), corrosive substance, vitriol. That
is the' way in which the scheme 'is to work. Of course, I might point out
that all the arguments as to whether a person is at fault himself in causing
his own injury become irrelevant. Arguments as to whether fraudulent
claims can be made are likewise avoided, because once injury exists, then
there must be a cause for it. It matters not whether it was caused by the
causes set out in the “Particulars of Cause of Injury" under the headings to
which i have referred in the paper, or whether they come under the
3particulars of causes set out elsewhere in the schedule. The position is,
excluding those matters referred to in clause 13, that once injury is shown
compensation is payable.
1 have attempted (although perhaps in a cursory manner) to look at
the philosophy behind these matters. I have referred, for example, to the
written submissions made before the Senate Committee. In particular I
would like to draw attention to that made by the Social Welfare
Commission (see p. '39 of my paper). It would seem that the three senators
who thought that there should be no exclusions of the type referred to in
clause 13 of the bill may (although we do not know because the reasons
are not given) have had regard to this type of submission. [have referred
to Senator Wright‘s dissent and I trust that you will read his reasons. It is
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signiﬁcant that although 'he feels that “crime should not pay"
(to use his
own words), he does not exclude ordinary social service payments.
in other
words, even though he dissents from what might be taken
to be the
majority .view, he nevertheless does not rule out the possibility
of
perpetrators of crimes and/or their dependants being entitled
to Social
Service payments. Although the Senate Committee proposed
alterations to
the bill, the alterations have not been signiﬁcant so far as the
philosophy
behind the bill is concerned and their only effect probably will
mean that
the scheme, even the injury side of it, will cost much
more than the
Woodhouse Committee originally contemplated.
'
My aim has been to highlight the provisions of this bill and
I think
that you will agree with me that having regard to what has
taken place in
other countries, especially in the United Kingdom and New
Zealand, and
also in the United States, this is indeed a revolutionary sc
heme. Nowhere
else can I findta scheme which seeks to compensate all. Perhaps
it is a
logical extension of the “good neighbour” principle. The vic
tim is no less a
victim because _he_ happens to. have been responsible in som
e way for his
misfortune. The injUred traveller spoken of in the parable, I sup
pose, was
entitled to compassion whether he had been attacked by thi
eves or whether
he, in trying to rob someone else, had been injured and had
been left by
the wayside. Most of us, I would'trust, would take the at
titude of Lord
Morris-y-Guest (who spoke after Baroness Wootton in the Hou
se of Lords
Debate to which .1 have referred). He said there that he for'on
e would not
pass on the other side 'of the road.
‘
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THE CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION ACT 1967
AS AMENDED AND ITS ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS
The Honourable Simon lsaacs, QC.
lately a Justice of the Supreme Court of N.S.W.
In 1959, one of England’s leading penal reformists, the late Margaret
Fry, campaigned strenuously for a scheme of compensation to be paid to
the victim of violent crime that would .be underwritten by the Government
so as to ensure payment to the victim. The Government took heed and
recognized the obvious difficulty that beset such victims, that generally
speaking people who committed such crimes were people without means or
assets to pay a verdict if recovered in the civil courts in an action for Tort.
In due course in 1964, the Government set up a tribunal to deal with all
such claims as might be made by victims and made provision for payments
of its awards by the Treasury! There is no statutory basis in England for
such a tribunal, notwithstanding attempts to introduce private bills for that
~ purpose. It seems that such private 'bills are fated not to be reached on the
days set down for their introduction but nevertheless the system or scheme
there works quite efﬁciently and well, and earns the title of one of the.
best schemes of it‘s kind in the world. ' .
Though there is no limit in England as to the amount which can be
awarded by the tribunal it has not acted in any extravagant or irresponsible
fashion although some awards are necessarily high. The awards are made in
respect of the injury inﬂicted and its consequences, physical and mental.
economic loss in the nature of wage loss, past, present and future and other
out-of-pockets, and extends to dependants of victims in the case of death
caused by the injury. The tribunal deals not only with claims arising out of
proceedings in the courts resulting in convictions but also where for some
reason those proceedings do not result in the conviction of the alleged
offenders, and also where the tribunal is satisﬁed as to the genuineness of
the claim but the assailant or assailants responsible for the criminal injury
are unknown or cannot 'be found.
The nature of this scheme and its results appealed strongly to the
warm humanity of Sir Kenneth McCaw, the former New South Wales
Attorney General, who introduced the bill entitled the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Act 1967 After 7% years of its operation, serious questions
arise for consideration which, if valid, might require further amendments to
the Act. The problems as I see them are as follows.
1. ‘ Are the present limits of $4,000 and $600 respectively adequate sums,
’ or ought they to be substantially increased or should there be no
limit as in England?
2. If there is to be some limit ought there to be some way of
distinguishing between the degrees of seriousness or gravity of the
injury inﬂicted and its consequences in respect of those claims which
undoubtedly deserve to be awarded at least the limit?
'3.- Why is there a distinction drawn in respect of the government’s
underwriting between claims relating solely to the injury and claims
for economic loss? (Under the present legislation the latter is not
covered at all by the underwriting provisions of the Act but is
virtually excluded therefrom.)
4. As “injury" under. the Act is deﬁned to include mental and nervous
shock. — ~
(a) why should an innocent bystander who witnesses the criminal
injury inflicted upon a victim and who thereby suffers mental
and/or nervous shock continue to be excluded from recovering
under the Act for that injury to himself?
(b) why should injury to those who go to the assistance of the
' police or a member of the public be excluded in cases where
the offender is not charged with injuring such persons?
5. Why should the dependants of avictim who dies as a result of
criminally inflicted injuries be excluded from the benefit of the
legislation?
6. In View of the Crimes Acts. 437A (1), (2) and (3) ought not the
direction in the first place under the section or order under s 554 (3)
"be made directly in favour ‘of the victim enabling him to obtain a
speedy payment leaving it to the Crown to pursue the offender civilly
by Virtue of the subrogation provisions if it so chooses?
7. ls it desirable to retain the Crown’s right to subrogation as deﬁned by
' the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act?
8. ‘ In view of the Ex Gratia Scheme provided by the Crown for those
'many cases where proceedings against an offender cannot be pursued
other than those covered by s. 4 (1) of the Act, and in View of the
fact that all payments by the Crown are now ex gratia, is it desirable
to change the whole procedure by vesting the authority to administer
the Act and the 'Ex Gratia Scheme in one single independent tribunal
instead 'of as at present by the judiciary and magistracy in cases
coming before the court and by the Under Secretary’s Department in
. the remaining cases?
These being the assOciated problems as I see them I now advert to each
seriatim.
l. The, amount.
As to felony or misdemeanour s. 437 of the Crimes Act 1900
provides as follows:
Where a person is convicted of any felony or misdemeanour the
court in which he was tried or any judge thereof, may, on such
conviction or at any time thereafter, direct that a sum not exceeding
one thousand pounds be paid out of the property of the offender to
any aggrieved person by way of compensation for injury, or loss,
sustained through, or by reason of, such felony or misdemeanour.
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This section, of course, by itself provided no underwriting by the Crown.
When the second reading of the 1967 Act was before Parliament, the
Honourable W. F. Sheahan,Q.C., a former Attorney-General who enjoyed a
long and wide practice in the Criminal law, observed that to his knowledge
since 1900 when it was first introduced, there had only been one case
where the section had been invoked and that was by the late Judge H. R.
Curlewis. The former Attorney-General Sir Kenneth McCaw observed that he
lilihSelf had never heard of an order having been made under the section.
That section derives from 33 and 34 Vict. C.23.5.4 (1870) which was
an Act to abolish “Forfeiture for Treason and Felony" empowering the
court on conviction for felony to award any person aggrieved for any loss
of property, a sum not exceeding one hundred pounds. When the Oimes
Act was enacted in 1900, s. 437 was limited to cases of felony, the amount
was specified as not exceeding five hundred pounds for injury or loss and
was otherwise in the form in which it now stands. In 1924, the words “or
misdemeanour” were added after “felony” and in 1951, and this is
important, by Act No. 59 s. 4 (a) the amount of five hundred pounds was
increased to one thousand pounds. That figure on the introduction of dollar
currency in 1966 became $2,000 and that figure remained unaltered until
1974 when by s. 9 (c) (i) of the Oimes and Other Acts (Amendment) Act,
No. 50 of 1974, the amount was doubled to $4,000.
Proceedings before justices were covered by s. 554 (3) of the Oimes
Act 1900 as amended in 1940 by Act No. 6 s. 4 to provide the
compensation for injury or loss to the person aggrieved,to be a maximum
sum of fifty pounds which by the 1951 Act 8. 4 (c) was increased to one
hundred and fifty pounds, converted in 1966 to $300.. Great economic
changes in the value of money have taken place since 1967 and there have
been consequentially substantial and dramatic changes in the verdicts
awarded by judges and juries for injuries and for economic loss, and by
1974 it was apparent to the legislature that these maxirna of $2,000 and
$300 respectively were hopelessly inadequate. Thus that same year they
were doubled. In my view, if maximum amounts are to be retained in the
legislation they are still hopelessly inadequate. I recognize that the
compensation provided by the Act is not to be a full compensation as in
an action for Tort, but is a compensation by way of solatium or
consolation for the injury or loss, but nevertheless on present day values it
does not require a very serious injury to qualify for the present maximum.
Though the measure of the'damages is not the same as in Tort it must
nevertheless be realistic in terms of the present day value of money. In
those terms the doubling of the amounts instead of being a step forward is
really a step in the reverse direction. For in 1966-67 when the change was
made to dollar currency, a dollar represented ten shillings of the former
currency and its purchasing power was the then equivalent of that ten
shillings but inflation, devaluation and the other economic circumstances
have reduced its former purchasing value to not more than one third of
what it was formerly — some people think even less and put it down to
one quarter so that any increase over $2,000 was one that should equate
the dollar to its pristine purchasing capacity and would necessarily require
at least trebling and probably quadrupling it either to $6,000 or $8,000. On
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the one basis i.e., the one third of its value the increase to $4,000 is only
the equivalent in value of $1,350 in 1967'which is only a little bit better
than the £500 of 1951, and on the other basis i.e., the one quarter of its
value, $4,000 today represents $1,000 in 1967 or the former £500 and that
is the figure that was there in 1900. So we have not progressed very much
at all.
I would strongly suggest that in the light of these considerations the
maximum, if there is to be one, should be not less than $10,000 for cases
within s. 437 and $1,000 for those under s. 554 (3).
"The English tribunal is in no way bound by any maximum figure, but
it has operated in a sensible way, yet not awarding extravagent «amounts.
Summaries of their awards with a brief description of the injury are to be
found in the Criminal Law Review and 1 indicate some of the higher
amounts:
f. Stg.
1965 Case No. 23 ' 2,520 lost sight one eye.
No. A51 950 arm injury and severe.
‘ " , anxiety and depression.
No. A52 1,000 stab in kidney.
No. 115 1,000 boy 10, eye injury.
' No. 116 23,323 eye injuries.
No. 14181 1,000 eye injury.
No. A124 1,690 death following
‘ fractured skull injury.
No. A1908 4,100 death following stabbing.
No. A1898 2,537 death following stabbing.
1966 Case No. H29 10,860 brain injury comprising
£8,000 stg. loss of
future earnings, £2,000 stg.
pain and suffering, and
£860 stg. loss of wages
to date.
No. A2265 4,055 severe eye injuries.
No. B81 2,536 loss sight one eye.
No. A248 2,250 eye injury.
No. A2085 5,500 ‘
No. H21 6,500
. ‘No. A278 3,850
, No. A3145 3,516 fatal injuries.
No. A332 4,900 '
No. A345 3,500
No. A3575 4,563
No. B1065 14,522 brain injury.
No. A318 3,527 scar on face, young woman.
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-£ stg.
1970 Case No. A565 3,256 injury — asthma — anxiety.
No. A559 11,928 blindness right eye.
No. A560 12,000 injuries both eyes.
No. A566 11,000 acid burns face and eye
(woman 33).
No. A572 4,000 corrosive acid — facial
‘ injury.
No. A574 7,633 knife lacerations —
anxiety — nervous.
No. A557 2,000 fractured skull.
No. A558 21,157 fractured skull — brain
injury 4 R. haemoplegia.
1971 Case No. A98 40,000 Cervical spine injury
- . man 28 complete paralysis
lower limbs, partial
' paralysis upper limbs. ,
No; H99 2,000 . fractured pelvis — police
‘ ' Ofﬁcer. '
No. H102 4,000 boy 11, eye injury
and emotional upset.
In 1973 Oiminal Law Review p. 418 et seq. there is a review by Mr
Alec Samuels of the operations of' the English tribunal called “The
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board”. In this he states that the Board
receives about 10 000 applications per year which only represents really one‘
third of those eligible in the light of criminal statitstics, but that in the
remaining two-thirds there would always be a number unwilling to take any
, proceedings. Over £3,000,000 stg. is paid over annually, the awards being
mostly £100—400 stg., but because of some substantial payments the
average was 3100 stg. and fairly static. There was one award for £40,000 stg.
for a paralysed 'victim aged 28 and the highest £51,000 stg. for total
blindness, loss of sense of taste, smell, impairment of hearing and other
injuries. * ‘ . ‘ ' ‘
Under the subheading of “Basis for Compensation” he writes:
The general principle is that the victim should receive
compensation on the basis of lump sum common law damages. An
interim or provisional payment may be made and increased from time
to time, for example, where only a provisional medical assessment can
be given in the first instance. A pension, certainly a contributory
pension will be ignored (1970 AC 1). The position under the scheme
differs in some material matters from the common law. There is a
minimum limit of £50 stg. The 'rate, of loss of earnings must not
exceed twice the average of industrial earnings at the time of the injury
(now well over £30 stg. per week) and there is no element comparable
to exemplary or punitive damages. Social security benefits are
deducted in full and the victim must obtain those benefits if he can.
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One recognizes that when introduced in New South Wales the
provision was an experiment, and on the basis that one has to crawl before
walking it was not unexpected that the underwriting was limited to the
amount of $2,000 already provided in s. 437 as an initial and cautious step.
I also realize that the volume of cases here must inevitably be lower than
in England, and that. we may not as yet have reached that millenium of
economic advancement or to be able to adopt the English basis of lump
sum common law damages.
My submission is that (a) a strong case is made out for a substantial
increase in the maximum amounts in respect of both s. 437 and s. 554 (3)
to not less than $10,000 and $1,000 respectively, and that (b) the ultimate
goal should be unlimited compensation with limitations similar to the
English scheme. After all the number of cases in which serious injuries of
the'types referred to in the Criminal Law Review are not the rule but
i rather the exception. This might. of course be an argument against increasing
beyond $4,000 but this category of cases of severe injury does exist and
should be adequately catered for. The English scheme of course includes
wage loss to date, future wage loss and death claims, all of which are
excluded by our Act and to which I shall later return.
2. Limits and Gradation of Serious Cases,
This situation arises as a result of the decision of the Court of
Criminal Appeal in R v."Forsythe [1972] 2 NSWLR'951. In that case a girl
aged. 16; a virgin, became pregnant as a result of rape by a person
convicted of that crime but she was not otherwise injured physically.
‘However she suffered psychological injury and was aborted on psychiatric
grounds. In an application to the Trial Judge, Collins J., pursuant to s. 437
his Honour awarded her $750 and in so doing said:
I am of the opinion that some proportion must be observed
between the injuries suffered in the particular case and the amount
that can be awarded in the most serious case.
His Honour took the view that the legislation had in effect said: ‘In respect
of each case the maximum is $2,000 and you have to do your best within
that giving the maximum to those who fall in the category of the worst or
'most serious cases and grade down the balance accordingly, making each
award to far as possible bear some proportion to each other within that
range of available money.’
An appeal was instituted by the Attorney-General on the ground that
the amount was inadequate, that in turn being based on the submission that~
in what His Honour said he has and in law in principle in regarding
$2,000 as the top of a scale rather than as a limit of jurisdiction.
The- Court (Jacobs P., Reynolds J. A. and Taylor J.) allowed the
appeal and substituted $2,000 holding that this sum was a limit on
jurisdiction and not a figure representing the upper limit of compensation.
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to be scaled down as his Honour had done. The learned president’s view
was that having regard to the factsthere was no reason for assessingcompensation at less than the limit of jurisdiction: ibid. 953-4.? '
Reynolds J. A. said:
In courts, the jurisdiction of which is limited in amount, if the
amount proved exceeds the jurisdictional limit, the full amount of the
limit is recovaable. No question of proportion arises. The section
likewise provides a jurisdictional limit. It does not call for a
categorization of injuries in terms of seriousness proportioned to their
severity . .. .' ibid p. 955.
Taylor J. at p. 956:
1 should say at the outset of these short reasons that l have in
making orders pursuant to s. 437 myself adopted this approach
(Le. the approach of the trial judge). Further consideration of the
matter has led. me to the conclusion that it is not correct . To
cansider that there may be other .victims who have suffered grievous
loss and injury and to regard the maximum of $2,000 as being
reserved for such a case, is to introduce a limitation on the amount
to be awarded in any particular case, not authorized by the section.The judge is concerned with the victim before him, the aggrievedpason and with his or her loss or injury. If in his view this loss orinjury warrants compensation of $2,000 or of' an amount in excess
thereof his order in my opinion should be for the maximum of .
$2,000. ' -
and he agreed that on the facts in this case $2,000 was the proper amount.
That was the view then of a very strong court as to the meaning ofthe $2,000 maximum and their reasoning and judgment must of courseapply equally to the new limit of $4,000. l.do not in any way seek to cast‘_ any doubt on the correctness of their judgment and l accept it without
question as the law to be applied. It would be improper for me to do
otherwise. But whilst it is an extremely fair and just result for the applicant
victim it is an unsatisfactory, unjust and inequitable result for the more
seriously and gravely injured. This of course is the sole fault of the-~ legislation in failing to recognize a “categorization of injuries in terms of
seriousness proportioned to their severity”. A victim’s injUry and loss may
properly be assessed at the maximum of. $4,000 because that is the proper
amount and no more to be awardedon the facts. A victim who is rendered
a paraplegic or quadraplegic, or who has lost an eye or who is rendered
totally blind, or who has lost both ,or one of his legs or arms, or who~
suffers a brain damage of such a magnitude that he is thereby reduced to a
vegetable or to such a stage of physical and psychiatric disability that his
working life is destroyed or in cases of less yet serious disabilityvis limited
to the identical amount of $4,000.
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The courts in assessing damages at Conlmun law endeavour to mai
ntain
a balance in respect of amounts awarded to plaintiffs for their injuri
es by
endeavouring to ensure that the damage in each case maintains some d
egree
of proportion to the respective injuries sustained in other cases and
their
consequences. The courts can classify these into minute, min
or, moderate,
moderately severe, severe, very severe and so on. There seems to me n
o
reason why the legislature cannot so provide for cases und
er s. 437. Of
course it was difficult to do so with the initial experiment of $
2,000, when
all that was contemplated was a solatium or consolation to be award
ed inla
summary way. It is still extremely difﬁcult and I should ventur
e impossible
to do so with $4,000 even if the‘ trial judge’s view had been
upheld. It is
this situation that tome calls for urgent revision -- not to reve
rse the
court’s construction, but if there is to be a limit th
en to enlarge such limit
to the ﬁgure I have suggested of not less than $10,000,
so as to provide
scope and make possible a more equitable adjustmen
t between victim
sufferers where the amounts that might properly be awa
rded may range up
to and within such newly enlarged limit as l have envisag
ed.
3. The exclusion of econo
mic loss.
It may come as a profound shock to the public that, notw
ithstanding,
a judge’s direction for compensation. under s. 437 inclu
des so much for the
actual injury and its attendant consequences as part
of injury but also
includes speciﬁc amounts for medical and hospital e
xpenditure (as now
,modified by Medibank), wages lost to date, future wa
ges that will be lost
and property loss, but so that the total of all these
headings does not
exceed the jurisdictional limit of $4,000 the only am
ount which may be
obtained from the Crown under the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Ad
1967 is the amount which the judge in his direction specifies
and relates to
the injury and its effects'and the other amounts are no
t compensated to
the victim by the Crown.
, Supposing, for example, in a case of injury inﬂicted
by a burglar on a
householder the judge assesses the damages for the i
njury at $1,500, and
33150 specifies (I leave aside hospital and medical
expenses) say $1,000 loss
of wages to date, $1,200 for future loss of earnin
gs and $300 for damages
to the householder’s property, all totalling $4,0
00, the only amount
recoverable from the Crown under the Act is $1
,500. I am at a loss to
understand Mr Down’s reference to the concern
of the Treasury and the
Department to find out how much is loss of wages
and other economic loss
and for the deduction for the amount of the awa
rd under s. 437 because
the judge has to specify in his award the amount
for injury and that is the
only amount that is compensated. The victim ha
s to chase the offender
through the courts for the balance or go without a
ny recoupment for them.
Now why is this so? Section 437 as it stood
in the Crimes Act before the
O'iminal Injuries Compensation Act 1967 still r
emains unamended save as to
amount. Under that section the court directs
the sum to be paid as
compensation for injury or loss sustained thro
ugh or by reason of the
felony or misdemeanour. “boss” is' contrasted with
“injury" and loss
certainly does not mean loss of the kind which
is an attribute of injury
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such as loss of sight, sense of smell, taste, or hearing, or loss of enjoyment
'of life or of life's amenities or loss of life expectancy. If those meanings
are excluded then it means economic loss — medical, hospital and Chemist’s
expenses, travelling expenses necessarily incurred in visiting doctors,
ambulances expenses, wages lost past, present and future, which are
attributable to the accident, and in appropriate cases damage to one’s
pléﬁerty.
If that section remained alone then the public might well have
expected the government’s underwriting to extend to all these matters as
well as to injury to the limit of jurisdiction in its totality.
But the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1967 made an important
alteration depriving the victim of being so covered even though it added to
the amount specifed for injury it would not exceed the limit. By s. 2 of
that Act “injury” only becomes bodily harm — including pregnancy, mental
shocks and nervous shocks. That means that the word “loss” in s. 437 and
s. 554 (3) of the Oimes Act is excluded from consideration under the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1967: That Act by s. 3 provides that
where a direction is made under s. 437 or s. 554 of the Crimes Act 1900
and is for a sum exceeding $100 and (this is the important matter) the
direction is for payment by way of compensation for injury then the
aggrieved person may apply to the Under Secretary for payment of the sum
so directed to be paid. Likewise in s. 4 (3) which deals with the giving of a
certiﬁcate in like terms where an accused is acquitted or where an
information for felony or misdemeanour is dismissed, the aggrieved person
may make a like application for the sum specified which by. s. 4 (l) is
limited to compensation for injury By s. S (2) (substituted by the Oimes
and Other Acts (Amendment) Act No. 50/74 s.17 (a)), the Treasurer may
make a payment to the applicant not exceeding the sum specified in s. 5
(l) which is the sum directed to be paid only in respect of injury. In
practice in drawing up the order containing either the judge’s order under s.
3 or his certificate 'under s. 4 the order expressly states the specific amount
of compensation directed or certified for “injury” and the total of the other
matters for “loss”(where the amount for “injury” is less than the limit).
It seems to me passing strange and unjust that within the limits of
the amount provided by the Act (now $4,000) if such a limiting provision
is to be retained “loss” should be so excluded. Very often wage loss forms
a substantial part of an injured person’s claim. Why should it be excluded,
at least so long as can validly be included within the limit of jurisdiction?
No explanation has ever been put forward for its exclusion. This limitation
was never adverted to by the Attorney-General in his Second Reading
Speech. In a passing reference the Honourable W. F Sheahan, Q..,C in
supporting the bill. Hansard p. 3916, said:
There will be questions that mfght arise in assessing loss in
relation to proposed payments How far ought they to go? Should the
vocation of the victim or his station in life have any bearing upon the
amount to be specified in the certiﬁcate?
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. 1 would strongly commend for consideration that there should be
provision to cover such loss to be underwritten in accordance with the Act
so long as it can be added to the amount Specified or directed in respect of
injury and the total be within the limit of jurisdiction whatever that limit
may from time to time be. One can quite understand the experimental
nature of the Act in 1967 and the need to proceed cautiously as well as
appreciating the state of the present day economy but I suggest that if the
exclusion of “loss” was but experimental then that stage has passed and the
time is now ripe for reconsideration. in England, because there is no limit,
wage loss, past, present and future, and other items of special damage are
included in the award of the tribunal. >
4. and 5. Mental and nervous shock.
Section 437 in its express terms does not limit the right to adirection for compensation to the particular or direct victim of the offenderbeingthe victim named. in the indictment, nor does 5. 554 contain any suchlimitation to the victim named in the information. The section gives thatV right, to obtain such direction to “any aggrieved person” and such languageis as wide as can possibly be, and in my submission is wide enough toCover persons suffering injury who come to the aid of police in the
execution of their duties, or who come to the aid of persons beingsubjected to criminal violence. The extension of the deﬁnition of injury tomental and nervous shock by s. 3 of the Criminal Injuries CompensationAct 1967 would cover, in my submission. innocent bystanders who sufferthat type of injury when Witnessing acts of criminal violence and whosuffer no other physical injury by their proximity to the scene of the crimeand whether such persons be called as witnesses at the trial of the offenderor not. The Crown may call such witnesses as part of its case, but may notfeel it necessary or desirable in the interests of the accused to call others.
Some may be called below but not above. Whether called or not their ownparticular injuries in the case of “interveners” may well be irrelevant to acharge that the accused committed the offence on the direct victim aswould evidence of nervous and mental shock by eyewitness bystanders.
Indications that these classes of persons were intended to be brought;within the ambit of the Act are to be found in the Attorney-General’sSecond Reading Speech: Hansard p. 3911—2, where the Attorney-General insupport'of his suggestion that the matter of assessing the compensation beleft to the courts said: “Indeed they are already present there as parties to
the action or as witnesses. "
Later he concluded:
, And the advantage is that by this proposed legislation anaggrieved person within the meaning of the sections 1 have mentioned
can be a person who comes to the assistance of the Police andreceives an injury while providing that assistance. Obviously such a
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person would be an aggrieved person within the meaning of the Act
and of the amendments made by this measure and is entitled to 'make
a claim. (ibid. }
With those views I would myself respectfullyagree
Mr Bowen, M...LA at p. 3916 expressed himself insupport of the
pidposed bill and said:
The person aggrievedcould be someone who had gone to the
assistance of a policeman. The .person aggrieved could be the mother
of a child who was killed and the parent would be aggrieved on the
basis of mental or nervous shock. I do not want an answer now, but
at some later stage the Attorney-General might tell me whether it is
intended that “an aggrieved person” would include those categories or
whetherit is intended that injury must relate to the person accused
of a felony, misdemeanour or other offence? [s it intended that there
must be direct association of the offence with the aggrieved person or
is it enough for a parent, for instance, to say ”my child was the
subject of this felony. . . I have suffered great mental and nervous
shock and 1 am therefore seeking compensation?"
In reply the learned Attorney--General said after referring to the case of
Hammill (sic Hambrooke) v Stokes and to the Law Reform(Miscellaneous
_ Provisions) Bill said:
Although it is not fortm'e to express an opinion on the Imatter,
and the opinions I express will'nbt have any inﬂuence on the court, I .
believe that the principles which are now fairly well established in this
field will guide the courts in administering this legislation”. (p. 3918)‘
_In R v McCafferty & Ors No. 2 1974 NSWLR 475 an application for a
direction under s.~437 came before Glass J. A. by the widow of a man
who had been' murdered. The application was in respect of injury‘to herself
and her eldest daughter and for financial loss to herself and her three
daughters as dependants of the deceased. Evidence was adduced establishing
that both she and her eldest daughter had suffered injury (presumably
mental and/or nervous shock) and that all the members of the family had
suffered loss as a result of the death of her husband by the subject murder.
His Honour refused the application holding ﬁrstly, that as
“dependants” of the deceased the family were not within the description of
“any person aggrieved” to be entitled for compensation for “loss”, and that
in relation to the claim for injury the widow and daughter were not the
immediate victims of the felony. '
The decision has not been tested on appeal and there is no reported
decision purporting to follow it in any other State.
 His Honour, it seems to me with great respect, has given a very
limited construction to the words “any person aggrieved” in respect of
compensation for “loss” as used in the. section. “Loss” being alternative to
“injury” connotes economic loss. That is the loss which a family sustains
by the death of the breadwinner and it might well be. thought that in these
circumstances the family were certainly persons aggrieved within the
meaning of “any person aggrieved" in the section in relation to their future
financial loss ﬂowing from the felonious act. The decision necessarily takes
dependant widows and children outside the ambit of s. 437.
For myself I would have thought they were both aggrieved persons
entitled to a direction under the section in respect of their ﬁnancial loss;
but it would have been a futile exercise in so far as the criminal Injuries
- Compensation Act 1967 is concerned for the directions would not relate to
“injury” to entitle them to make the application to the Treasurer for
payment. They could have, of course, registered it in the District Court
under the new 5. 457 (3) of the Crimes Act as amended by No. 50/74 s.
10 (3) but that would probably have been worthless save for framing in the
family kitchen for the reasons I have already advanced. His Honour appears
to have founded his rejection of both claims however on the ground that s.
437 required the Court to consider any behaviour of the applicant which
contributed directly or indirectly to the injury or loss of the applicant. He
said at p. 476:
In directing the Court to have regard to any behaviour of the
. aggrieved person which directly or indirectly contributed tohis injury
‘or loss there is an implication that usually a question of this kind will
arise for decision. It could not be said that the behaviour of the
dependants of victims and its alleged contribution to the crime would
regularly require consideration in this context.
With great deference there are multitudinous cases of assault and violent
injury 'where the victim is completely innocent, e.g. if he is suddenly set
upon by thugs or hoodlums on his way either to work or home. No
question can possibly arise as to his conduct and the only answer that
could be given in that regard visa-vis him is nil because on those facts
there is nothing to consider. Nor could there be any behaviour to consider
if the injury to the widow and eldest daughter was mental or nervous shock
either from witnessing, for example, the stabbing to death or his shooting
or from being apprised of the brutalrmurder of husband and father. Alive
or dead there seems to me to be nothing to preclude the court from saying
that on the evidence the behaviour of the claimant if alive or of his
dependants if the victim be dead in no way directly or indirectly
contributed to the injury or loss of either.
However, just as the bulk of such clairns involve no behavioural enquiry
of thevictim there can be other cases where such may be necessary both as
to injury and loss in so far as the latter may be included up to the
jurisdictional limit; for example, if a husband kills or otherwise injures his
wife’s lover in her presence from which she suffers mental and nervous
shock, or vice versa if the wife similarly kills or injures her husband in his
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mistress’ presence from which she suffers mental or nervous shock, or if the
person going to the assistance of the police or a citizen and is injured but
is grossly affected by liquor, or used unnecessary violence in his
intervention which resulted in retaliation Contributing to his injury.
In view of this decision in relation to both injury and loss a great
defect now is demonstrated in the legislation. The matter needs
consideration both as to the situation of aggrieved persons such as these for
injury to themselves whether physical or mental or nervous shock, as well
as for financial loss, at least to the amount speciﬁed from time to time as
the jurisdictional limit. The anticipations of the Attorney-General as to the
meaning that might be given to “aggrieved persons" and to “injury" being
extended to include mental and nervous shock have not been fulfilled and
justice requires that these situations be explicitly and adequately covered.
Finally on this aspect I would point out that dependants can claim .
for the loss of their financial dependency under similar legislative schemes
in Victoria, New Zealand and in the United Kingdom but they are expressly
excluded in Queensland and South Australia.
6. Obtaining the fruits of an Order under s. 437 or s. 554 (3).
It appears to me beyond controversy that what the victim wants is a
simple procedure and method of collecting the amount awarded him under
either section. In relation to the Courts of Petty Sessions, it is cold comfort
to him if the magistrate’s order for compensation not being complied with,
the offender can be committed to prison in the same way as if he fails to
pay a ﬁne. In relation to District Courts and Central Criminal Court one
can confidently say that the' last thing the victim wants to be embroiled in
is a civil action for tort, whether brought at his own expense or with legal
'aid, and to recover a verdict recognized by all who have any knowledge of
this situation that such actions are usually fruitless because the offender is a
man of straw. Usually the victim is sick and tired of being dragged through
the procedures of the criminal courts; first of all the committal proceedings
and then after considerable lapse of time the trial itself. If perchance there
is a new trial then once again he appears before judge and jury with all of
its attendant worries and anxieties, giving evidence on each of the occasions
of the commission of the offence and the wounds and other injuries
inﬂicted. When at last the criminal proceedings are over the victims usually
vow never again to go to court and hence, by and large, they are never
interested in taking civil proceedings which might take another one to two
years at the best before they conclude and which, even when verdict -is
obtained, are worthless.
In 30 years of practice at the Bar, I only recollect one case where in
the mid 1940’s a conviction having been obtained against a migrant for
having conspired with others and procured them to bash up his neighbour
which they effectively did, the neighbour sued the offender in tort for
assault and obtained a verdict of $5,000, which he fully recovered because
the offender was a man of means. There may have been other cases, and
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whilst on the bench, motor car cases apart, 1 never tried such a civil case
nor do I know of any. There are, of course, cases where civil recourse may
be warranted but the victim wants nothing more to do with the courts.
Speaking generally the civil remedy is seldom used.
‘As framed, the direction under s. 437 is made for the offender to pay
out of his property to the aggrieved person the amount speciﬁed for
personal injury and for other loss up to a total figure of the prescribed
limit.- He can then register the direction as a judgment of the District Court
and, of course, execution can issue upon it. He can have the offender
brought to the court to be examined as a judgment debtor. He can issue
execution usually to be told that there is a return of nulla bona, something
he already knew, and if he suspects that the offender has property, money,
-mOtor car or real estate he can even issue a bankruptcy notice and
ultimately send him bankrupt. All of this involves time, expense and worry
to the already harassed man and all of it realises nothing. Having
exhausted all his remedies he can then seek payment from the Crown for
so much of the order or direction as related to injury or, if the proposal
which I have suggested earlier be acceded to, then for the full value of the
order
‘ ‘There is no direct provision in the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act
1967 requiring him to. establish that he has pursued all his civil remedies
and either has received-nothing thereby or only something, but it seems to
be implicit in s. 5 (1) (b). That section provides that when such application
' for, payment is made to the Under Secretary pursuant to s. 3, the Under
Secretary has to forward a signed statement to the Treasurer setting out the
application specifying the sum for injury granted under s. 437 and:
(b) any amounts which, in the opinion of the Under Secretary,
the applicant has received, or would, if he had exhausted all relevant
rights of action and other. legal remedies available to him, receive,
independently of thisAct, by reason of the injury to which the
application relates.
Before so doing a questionnaire is sent to the applicant, or it is embraced
in the form of application he makes, asking him to state whether he has so
exhausted all his rights, the results, and for particulars of such actions etc.
Usually the applicant does not answer, or untruthfully answers only “Yes”.
The Under Secretary’s Department generally view this sympathetically and
puts the telescope to the “Nelson eye” on these answers for they already
know from police enquiries, or can soon find out themselves, that the
offender has no assets or means whatever. The Department commendably
'certifies to the Treasury benevolently. Now why should the poor victim,
perhaps still suffering from his injuries, be subjected to all these procedures,
eXpense and unnecessary rigmarole? He is not interested in the offender or
paper chasing with his judgment. He is only interested in getting what has
been certiﬁed by the judge from the State and, getting it as soon as
possible. Goodness knows he has waited long enough since the event -—
sometimes up to 2 years and even longer.
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In due course he gets payment for the amount specified for injury. he
can tear up his» judgment for the unpaid economic loss, and the Crown can,
under the principle of subrogation' conferred by the Act take proceedings
under the judgment to recoup’itself as best it can for what it has paid.
. ‘Now obviously a much simpler procedure is desirable. The order of
fitlb’i'lties should be reversed and the order Should go in the first instance
directly against the Crown and much more speedily in its results — a matter
with which I shall later deal. , p ' '
The Law Reform Commission of Western Australia in its working
paper on criminal Injuries Compensation dated 3rd June, 1975 reported in
relation to this subject and dealing with a proposed Act containing
provisions similar in principle and terms to the New South Wales legislation
recommended:
The Commission considers that the Act should be recast so as to
render the Consolidated Revenue primarily liable to pay any
compensation ordered to be paid under the Act. This arrangement will
bring the form of the remedy into line with current practice and
experience — namely as a form of civil remedy intended to provide
monetary compensation from the State for a victim who has suffered
personal injury. (p. 9 para. 16.)
That in my view is sound practicalycommonsense and] would heartily
endorse such a recasting of our own Act, subject to the inclusion of
aeonomic loss and with the changes in Tribunal hereinafter referred to.
7. The Oown's right to subrogation.
To be or not to be —- that is the- question. There are two opposing
schools of thought and it is not easy to resolve the conﬂict.
On the one hand there is the view that the offender must make and
be compelled to make reparation. If the Crown steps in and pays, it ought
to have the right to take the step which the victim does not want to take
and recover from the offender what the Crown has paid out. Advocates of
this view even think that the Crown should be entitled to pursue its right
of recovery even to bankruptcy proceedings, so that the Crown would then
be entitled to priority over other debts of the offender.
On the other hand the school of thought is that there should be
no such right. Its proponents firstly point to the situation that under the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Act' l967 there is no legal obligation on the
part of the Crown to pay'the amount directed under s. 437 or s. 554 (3),
that under the 1967 Act'it was a matter of discretion in'the Treasurer
whether he would or would not pay the amount relating to. “injury” under
the direction — it was not a direction to the Treasurer or Crown — and it
was even discretionary upon the Treasurer whether he would pay the whole
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am0unt of the direction which related to injury. Under the 1974
amendments all payments are now ex gratia and not as of fight: 8. 17 (a) of
No. 50/74; but for the statute “subrogation” in its true sense is scarcely
applicable.
This school of thought also considers that it is improper for the.
Crown to be doing what really amounts to the collection of a civil debt.
The direction under s. 417, when registered in the District Court as now
provided under No. 50/74 becomes a judgment debt by the offender to the
victim. As such of course it lasts for twenty years. The victim wants
nothing to do with enforcing it because it will nearly always be fruitless. If
he thinks that it might be of some material worth he can take the risk of
bringing .the action. But the view is that if he does not and is satisfied to
rely on the Crown‘s benevolence in relation to “injury", then the Crown
should; not even to that extent take over his civil rights to recover the
judgment debt or any part of it, and that the Crown’s interest against the
offender should cease on the termination of the criminal proceedings. It is
also held that such a procedure may well militate against the prisoner’s
rehabilitation — the threat that at any time ‘after he is released the Crown
will be 'capable of purSuing him to recover what it has in its benevolence
paid to the victim, the threat or fear that during his incarceration the home
of his family in which he might have an estate or joint tenancy, mortgaged
though it might be to a bank or building society, might in some way be
jeopardized, and the fear that his meagre gaol earnings may even be taken
away during his imprisonment, all build up anxieties and depression and an
anti-social attitude which may well be destructive of rehabilitation
procedures not only during his custodial sentence but on his release by the
Parole Board and even after the full term of his sentence.
It is not easy to reconcile these conﬂicting views and it is even more
difﬁcult to provide any solution. Much more is required to be known
perhaps by an in depth enquiry. These are troublous questions. For
example, from what source is the Crown to obtain repayment? Are his .gaol
earnings to be the subject of garnishee or equivalent attachment? For what
period of time is the Crown right to persist — for the whole 20 years of
the effective life of a judgment, or only during his incarceration, or is it to
be suspended whilst under parole and above all should the Crown be
enabled to recover the 'Whole of what it pays out or only some limited
portion thereot‘? These are some of the problems that require investigating
and elucidation. In England, the offender himself cannot be ordered to
reimburse the State for money paid by it to a victim by way of
compensation.
In Western Australia where the Act in similar terms to ours has been
in operation since 1970, down to June, 1975, in eleven cases in which the
Treasury has paid $11,620 to victims the Crown has recovered a mere $43
from offenders - an average of less than $4 for each. What a great
vindication this must be.
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Since 17th January, 1968, in New South Wales to lune, 1975, of a
total of $300,894 paid by the Crown, less than $12,000 has been recovered
by the Treasury under the subrogation provision.
The ﬁgures which have been kindly supplied to ‘me by the
Attorney-General’s Department of claims paid under the Act appear to be
as follows:
Up to 1972 1973 1974 1975
$29,529 $41,107 $97,588 $132,670
These total . $300,894
Amount received 1973—74 1974—75 ‘
by recovery action $3,358 $7,752
by Crown
. These total ' ; . $11,110.
_ The total number of cases involved in such recovery actions are ninety
averaging $123.45. Undoubtedly .a ,better average result than Western
Australia, but is it really worthwhile? What expense is involved in time,
.man hours, staffing, department records and the like in' producing this
mouse is not known. One could safely assume a half, but it could be very
- much more. In making these observations as to expense involved, I do not
in any way reflect upon the administration and I only hope I am quite
wrong — but then one gets back to the basic question as to the
continuance or not of subrogation. For myself, I support the second school,
my antipathy being founded in part on objection to the Crown becoming a
debt collector in proceedings which result from its prosecution of criminal
Offences, in part on the detriment to the offenders rehabilitation and the
fears ,to the family he leaves behind, and finally to the paucity of the
results — the proof of the pudding being in the eating. Nothing that I have
said should be read as in any way discouraging offenders from making such
voluntary compensation either directly or through family assistance as they
may be able to afford. _
8. The tribunal
The question here is whether the courts should deal with applications
in relation to those matters which come before it or Whether .an
independent authority ‘should be set up_ as in England to deal 'with all such
claims. Leaving the matters to the court which dealt with t e particular
crime was favoured by the former Attorney-General as a protec ‘on for the
public and the Treasury against false or exaggerated claims, and on the
footing that it could save time because the injured party or witness would
have 'been seen and heard by the trial judge and he would be familiar with
the evidence already given both at committal and trial of the injuries and
their effect, and so save further hearings and the distress and anguish arising
therefrom. This was the view of Reynolds J. (as he then was) that-the Act '
provided for an award to victims in a summary way for doing some
measure of justice to the victim of a crime without the delay, expense and
formality of a civil action and indeed for those reasons and the limited
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amountof the jurisdiction no further evidence should be allowed on the
hearing of such application. R v. Bowen 90 WN (NSW) 82 at 84. I
myself followed this approach in R v. Tcherchian reported in the same
volume p. 85 at p. 86—88. In retrospect this approach appears to be too
narrow and there is a much greater tendency in the last few years to depart
from it. Nowadays the application, as a rule, is not made to the judge
immediately after the trial at the court of trial but on a different later
occasion to the trial judge in Public Chambers when additional evidence of
a medical nature and of wage loss and other outgoings may be adduced to
bring these matters up to date. Evidence of injury is only dealt with in a
relatively cursory way at committal proceedings and economic loss and
other expenditure not at all. Only so much of injury is adduced to satisfy
the statutory requirement of the nature of the particular injury and at the
trial the Crown Prosecutor is content, as a matter of fairness to the
accused, to deal with injury generally in bald outline but sufﬁcient to
enable the jury to understand, for example, whether “grievous bodily harm”
.has been sustained. Expenditure and economic loss is irrelevant and
accused’s counsel either does not cross-examine on injury at all or only
slightly if he can deduce any matter reducing the initial seriousness of the
injury as fer example, to establish complete or substantial recovery.
‘Moreover, when the application is heard at the court of trial the Crown
Prosecutor is almost without exception without any instructions on the
matter, and has to either ask for an adjournment to another day in
Chambers and to be excused from attending thereon usually some other
departmental Crown ofﬁcer will attend —— or he simply adduces no material
and: throws the whole onus on the trial judge _of deciding the matter
virutally ex parte. As generally a considerable time has expired — up to 2
years or even more — since the occurrence of the event there is not only a
paucity of material before the trial judge but no sufﬁcient or proper
investigation on behalf of the Crown or up-to-date medical examinations or
financial investigation had been held. The judge is left to grope and make
the best intelligent assessment he can, although his task is simpliﬁed if the
facts of the commission of the crime itself and of injury would in his view
without more warrant the awarding of the maximum jurisdictional amount.
Another drawback is the long period of delay which. must inevitably elapse
before. there is a conviction or before the criminal proceedings are ﬁnally
’ disposed‘of. Interim orders cannot be made and such delays defeat justice.
, Under the system as at present there are three Tribunals dealing with
such claims:
(1) Judges of the Supreme Court and District Court exercising
_ criminal jurisdiction;
(2) Magistrates and the District Court judges entertaining appeals
. ' therefrom, and
(3) The Treasury per medium of the Under Secretary’s Department
dealing with ex graria payments for the unsolved etc.., crime. The
proceedings and orders under s. 554 (3) before magistrates may
be disposed of fairly quickly and those in the ex gratia category
may be also dealt with expeditiously as soon as police enquiries
are completed and the genuineness of the claim established.
69
The following list of police statistics, show that for the year 1974
v there were 3 899 violent offences involving injury accepted by the police as
4 genuine and of these only 2675 police “cleared”, i.e. proceeded to
ﬁnalization in the courts. Thus 1224 were either unsolved or not able to
be proceeded with for some reason or other. It is not clear whether
"glear‘ed" includes cases where proceedings were dismissed on the merits or
where for reason of age, infirmity, insanity or other legal impediement or
incapacity there was no actual conviction. But this apart it seems that there
were one third approximately of the valid claims not finalized by court
proceedings.
1974 Police Statistics
Violent offences reported and accepted by the police
Assaults . 8 Accepted , ' Cleared
Grievous bodily harm ~ ' ‘ I .60 51
On child , 8 81 ~ 56
Malicious wounding ‘ , ‘260 172
Occasioning actual bodily harm . ‘ 510 4432 -.
On police . ' “167 162
Common .3 1,345 789
On female ‘ 3932 559
Homicide and attempts ..
Murder 58- 40
Attempted murder or accessory 27 23
Manslaughter 50 50
Culpable driving causing death 87 83
'Other
Culpable driving causing injury 81 79
Shoot, attempting grievous bodily
. harm ‘ 10 10
Abduction 29 , l7 '
Negligent Act occasioning grievous
bodily harm . ' l 21 19
Rape ‘ ~ " , 181 133'
‘ 3 899 2 675
, V 2 675 ,
Approximately 1/3rd unsolved ‘ 1 224
_ But three or more separate tribunalsare unnecessary and undesirable
and in my submission there ought to be only one body, namely an
independent tribunal established on the English lines that is able to grapple
and deal with all such claims as far as possible in an informal and
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expeditious manner. Such a tribunal, and this is important, has not to await
the outcome of criminal proceedings. lts task is not to determine the guilt
of any person but merely to establish the injury and loss resulting from
criminal or quasi-criminal conduct. All persons involved in making claims are
dealt with by the one tribunal and there is no ground for dissatisfaction on
the grounds, for example, that one often hears that one is by a magistrate
and the other by a judge, or that a judge is perhaps a Supreme Court judge
and another one of the District Court, or that the present ex gratia class is
being treated less generously than by judges because (a) it is a government
department dealing with the claim and (b) such claimants are awarded
smaller amounts because they are heard ex parte, the offender has not been
heard, and generally there is an air of suspicion attached to them. After
thoughtful consideration l myself favour the establishment of an
Independent Statutory Board but on the English lines, i.e. it be composed
of lawyers experienced in Common Law and criminal cases whether in
practice or retired.
In England, the scheme is administered by a Board appointed by the
Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Scotland, after consultation
with the Lord Chancellor, and the Chairman and the members are all legally
qualiﬁed and are all part time. The Chairman is Sir Walter Carter, Q.C., the
Senior Official Referee of the Supreme Court; the Deputy Chairman is Sir
Ronald Morrison, Q.C., of both English and Scottish Bar but retired from
practice. There are additionally three Q.C.’s, of the English Bar, two
solicitors, a past President of the Law Society and the Vice President of the
Law Society, and two silks of the Scottish Bar, and the scheme has an .
internal mode of appeal from a decision of a single member with an appeal
if dissatisfied to a committee of three members. Except in single member
cases the work is done at executive level and requires a wide general
knbwledge together with a high standard of ability and judgment. The
literature shows that about 80 per cent of all applications are resolved
. within 6 months of their receipt by the Board and half of those are
resolved within 3 months.
. In' Australia, New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia
(now under review by the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia)
still adhere to the courts, but the other states have statutory Boards, and
New Zealand a special administration Tribunal. in British Columbia the
Tribunal is the Workers‘ Compensation Board because, according to their
literature, it has had years of experience in injury cases.
In the United States, crime compensation programmes on the English
pattern have been made by California, New York, Maryland, Hawaii,
Massachussets and New Jersey, but of the three options for jurisdiction viz.
by the creating of a new quasi-judicial administrative body by the use of an
existing administrative body or by the use of the court, only Massachussets
has assigned the administration of its crime compensation programme to the
courts and only California has used an existing administrative body.
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In the United States, the‘ only professional or educatiOnal
qualifications applied to Board members are legal training and experience,
but the author of an article in 1973 in. the American Bar Association
. Journal has suggested a layman and a woman might also be added as well
as a doctor. He writes: ' ‘ ‘
There would seem to be no good answer to whether it- would be
preferable to have the doctor check the law books or to have the ‘
lawyer checkthe medical books,
In conclusion I should like to express my appreciation and extend
thanks to Professor Roulston for the large mass of material he has
generously placed at my disposal and to the kind assistance rendered me by
the ofﬁcers of the Attorney-General’s Department especially the Statistical
Section.
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COMMENTARY
The I-Immuruble Mr Justice D. A. Yeldham
Supreme Court of New South Wales
May I say two things at the outset. Firstly, I would express my
gratitude to those who invited me to this seminar, with the opportunity to
benefit from the discussion which has taken place, notwithstanding the task
'which I have been given. I was somewhat apprehensive when I saw that I
came well down in the batting order, as I assumed, and I think correctly,
that most of the good shots would by then have been made and the wicket
would be becoming'a little sticky. In any event I speak with diffidence in a
field in which experienced judges,and those who are more familiar with the
principles and practice of the criminal law than I am, have differed, often
quite markedly, in their interpretation and application of the various Acts
' providing for compensation for victims of crime.
' The second thing ’I wish to do is to express my gratitude — and I
. know Ispeak for us all .- to the learned author of this paper. I know of
my own observation how hard he has worked upon it and he has given us
the benefit of his own vast experience at the Bar and particularly upon the
_Bench. I have found the paper stimulating and in some respects provocative
’. and I hope that I will not be accused of failing to provoke discussion upon
it if I indicate my agreement in large measure with the solutions which the
author suggests to the various problems which he has raised
In the course of my own limited experience with the provisions here
in question, my reading of various articles and authorities, and my
discussions with others, ! have not become aware of- any significant
problems (and that is not of course to say that there are none) which are
not here adverted to and I think that the best course to adopt is to
comment upon the various matters raised in the order in which they have
been dealt with in the paper.
Despite early divergent opinions, it is now generally accepted that the
object of legislation such as that which we are considering is — and in my
opinion'jtvshould continue to be — as Mr Justice Reynolds put it in R v
Bowen 90 W.N. (Pt. I) 82 to provide a broad and summary method which
will afford some measure of justice to the victim of a crime without the
delay'rexpense and formality of a civil action a statement which His
Honour repeated when a member of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v.
[org/Me (1972) 2 N..SW...LR 951 In the same case Mr Justice Jacobs
_described it as “a form of compensation sui generis’ and added that
although an order under s. 437 is deemed part of the sentence the section
itself is primarily, one for compensation unrelated to any scale of
punishment. In R v Tcherchian 90 WN. (Pt l) 85 Isaacs J. as the author
of the paper then was, expressed and applied the principle which Reynolds
I. had stated in Bowen3 case.
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Bray C. J. in In re Pnore (1973) '6 S.A.S.R. 308 atg3I0 agreed that
the purpose of the legislation was to afford a quick remedy to the injured
party in addition to his" ordinary remedies, and said it reﬂected the
recognition of ‘an obligation on the part of the community in appropriate
cases to see that those injured by violent crimes are not deprived of
effective relief up to the statutory limit because of the irnpecuniosity of the »
Wi‘bhgdoer. He added that the amount is merely on account of the'damages
which the injured party might recover in a civil court against the criminal. '
These expressions and others like them, which contradict what was
said in some earlier cases, especially those in Queensland, were based
substantially upon the fact that the legislation under consideration in each
case provided an arbitrary upper limit to the compensation which could be
awarded, a limit which in many cases was quite insufﬁcient to fully
compensate the injured victim. I think however that such a description of
the object of the legislation may also properly be derived from the fact
that it is public moneys which are in .the main employed to pay the
amount awarded and that, in any event; the civil rights of the victim against
the criminal (which of course in many cases are worth but little) are not
taken away. In England, however, where there is no upper limit there is less
reason for characterizing the right to compensation in the way which has
been done in this country. Principles which have been applied in cases such
as Bowen ’s case should 1 think largely influence our thinking in relation to
the reforms which we are considering. ‘
The upper limit of compensation
i would firmly support the retention of an upper limit to the amount
which may be awarded to the victim and paid from public funds. The limit
in New South Wales presently applying is substantially more generous than
that in any of the other States where a similar scheme exists. I think that
few would disagree that the ravages of inflation would require that upper
limit to be raised and if necessary reviewed periodically. The Law Reform
Commission of Western Australia (where the limit was $3,000 in the case of
indictable offences and $300 for summary Offences) expressed its view in a
recent report: ~ . ,
“It seems clear that there is a strong case for a fairly substantial
increase”. ‘ . ‘ ,
However even if it is desirable for the public purse to provide a fund
from which full and complete compensation may be, paid to victims of
crime (a view which I do not share) I think that the financial burden
involved must inevitably compel the conclusion that such a scheme would
not be feasible.
There appears now to be substantial judicial agreement that the
principles to be applied in assessing the amount of compensation are,
broadly speaking, those used in the assessment of civil damages although in
most cases the person making the assessment is required to take into
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account matters such as the behaviour of the aggrieved person and the
relationship between that person and the offender. It is clear also that in
most States of Australia the maximum sum is no longer regarded as being
the top of the scale but as a limit of jurisdiction or a cut-off point.
In these circumstances if the upper limit was to be removed and the
ordinary principles of assessment of damages applied there is no doubt that
on occasions the public purse would be required to pay compensation
amounting to very substantial sums. Whilst such claims may not be
numerous there would be occasions where a quadraplegic or paraplegic or
person with serious brain damage or other serious injuries may, by the
application of ordinary common law principles, become entitled to a very
significant amount even if as at present, and contrary to the
recdmmendation which is made by the writer of the paper which I support,
amounts for actual financial loss are not taken into account. Perhaps in
answer to this it may be said that in England, where there is no ceiling
imposed (although there is a prescribed maximum rate for loss of earnings
and earning capacity which is not to exceed twice average industrial
earnings) the average of all awards made by the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Board between 1964 and 1971 was only 3100 and only 4
per cent of such awards were for £1,000 or over and 55 per cent were
between £100 and £399. Nonetheless experience in relation to civil awards
has shown that, whatever be the reason, damages for personal injuries in
this State in most cases are substantially higher than those awarded for
similarfinjuries in England and indeed in most other States of Australia. I
have little doubt that if the upper limit of compensation was removed any
fund provided to meet the awards which would be made would have to be
substantial indeed. Any such scheme would undoubtedly impose very severe
burdens upon the public purse and consequently upon the taxpayers from
whose pockets it must of course initially come, but it would also put the
victim of crime very often in a position of considerable advantage over the
victim of a tort (i.e. in cases where the tortfeasor was not insured) and
would also, whether or not any right of subrogation existed, in some cases
give the wrongdoer a ﬁnancial advantage which is not enjoyed by a
tortfeasor. in my opinion any of these consequences would be hard to
justify.
The author of the paper has suggested an upper limit of $10,000 in
relation to orders made under s. 437 and $1,000 in relation to s. 554. It is
obvious that any amount must be arbitrary and I would support these
figures. I think consideration should also be given to excluding from the
scheme all injuries caused by the use of motor cars except perhaps in a
limited class of case (for example, the use of an uninsured motor vehicle
upon an area which is not _a public street) where the authorized insurer or
the nominal defendant willnot satisfy any civil verdict. In South Australia
in In re‘Sargeant (1973) 6 S.A.S.R. 321 the Full Court held that the
expression “compensation" in the South Australian Act included aggravated
damages and, by a majority, that it did not include punitive damages.-
Although aggravated damages have been said (and perhaps most recently in
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the House of Lords in Broome v. Cassel & Co. (1972) A.C. 1027) to be
compensatory and not punitive, nonetheless I find it very difﬁcult to justify
the award of damages of that nature in a scheme which is intended to give
reasonable compensation only.
Amounts payable for. different serious crimes
How then, as the author of the paper asks, is any distinction to
be
drawn between the amounts payable for different serious crimes with
in the
limit of $10,000 or whatever it may be? ‘
I must confess that I find no difﬁculty in ’supporting
the
reasonableness of the principles which were enunciated in R
v. Forsythe
(1972) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 951.’ If the upper limit is regarded simply as a cut
-off
point or a limit of jurisdiction and not as the top of a scale, I see litt
le
injustice in the maximum amount being paid tovarious persons
who, whilst
seriously injured, may as between themselves normally attract s
ubstantially
different awards of civil damages. Any retention of an upper
limit must
necessarily involve this result which does not, in my vie
w, afford a sound
argument for removing it. What is given is some modest compens
ation from
the public purse quickly and in a summary way, in circum
stances where
until recent years the victim would be left to his recourse
against the
criminal. if the result is that victim A may be fully compensa
ted by an
award of say $10,000 or less and victim B only partially comp
ensated by
the maximum sum assuming it is $10,000, that is one of
'the inevitable
results of a system which cannot hope to do complete jus
tice. 1 would be
totally opposed to the concept of the maximum sum being
the top of a
scale -— such result would undoubtedly bring about great
er injustice than
would the other approach.
boss of wages and out-of—pocket expenses
I think that there is little, if any, justiﬁcation for excluding
from the
amount to be paid from consolidated revenue
such part of the
compensation assessed as includes loss of wages, past
and future, and
medical expenses (although with the advent of Medibank
this will no doubt
become less of a problem). Such losses are very often the
most important
part of any award of compensation — especially, for exam
ple, in the case
of a totally incapacitated person, and it is difficult to see
why a distinction
has been drawn between “injury” as defined and “
loss". However i think
that if this recommendation is adopted matters such
as sick pay, workers’
compensation, superannuation, pensions and perhaps t
he proceeds of certain
insurance policies should be taken into account even
though, in most cases,
they would be left out of consideration in the assess
ment of damages in a
civil claim. As it is public funds which are to be called u
pon to compensate
the victim and as the object of the scheme is t
o proVide reasonable
assistance rather than full compensation _l_ find it
difficult to' justify any
recommendation which does not direct that ma
tters such as l have
mentioned be taken into account. Indeed
if the Criminal Injuries
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Compensation Act 1967 did authorize payment by the Treasury of that
portion of the amount awarded which represented loss of wages and
out-~of~pocket expenses, the existing provisions of s. S (1) (b) would no
doubt cover the situation. -
Although it does appear from what Mr Downs has said that in
administering the Ex Gratia Scheme out-of-pocket expenses and loss of
wages are in general allowed after making any appropriate deductions for
moneys already received, nonetheless, it appears to be clear from thedeﬁnition of “injury” and “loss" and the provision in s. 3 (b) which relatesonly to a direction fora sum in excess of $100 to be paid by way ofcompensation “for injury” that, except under the Ex Gratia Scheme, no
amount awarded in relation to financial losses is recoverable from the fund.
Claims of “innocent bystander”
With some diffidence I disagree with the author of the paper inrelation. to the case of the innocent bystander who may suffer mental or
nervous shock in consequence of observing or hearing a crime being
committed. The matter is one upon which minds might easily differ but,
having regard to the object of and the necessary limitations upon a scheme
such as we are discussing 1 think it is necessary to draw a line between
those who may call upon public funds and those who may not. I see little
reason for giving a bystander who suffers mental or nervous shock any
rights over and above those which he now has to sue for damages at_
common law. If the shock was suffered as a consequence of an act of
negligence an action for damages would in most cases lie and, although any
similar consequence from a crime would probably be confined to a limited
number of cases, nonetheless I see little justification for including it in thescheme. However, I do think- that a claim by a spouse, parent or child for
nervous shock is in a different situation and should be within the scope ofthe legislative provisions. I express no view as to whether or not, upon aproper construction of the present legislation, such a claim would ,becovered having regard to the decision of Class I. A. to which in anothercontext 1 will shortly refer. I would add that I would like to see expressprovision made for compensation to a person injured whilst assisting policeto, apprehend a criminal - in' Western Australia the Police AssistanceCompensation Act 1964 provides for compensation to persons injured whilstassisting police and treats them as if they were crown employees andperhapsfthis is a special case which should be provided for.
Dependants of a deceased person
The decision of Mr Justice Glass to which 1 referred a moment agoand which is discussed in the present paper was in R v. McCafferty (1974)1 N.S.W.L.R. 475. This decision, which was probably required by the termsof the present legislation (although I understand it has not been followedby at least one other Supreme Court judge) discloses a situation which, Iagree, should be rectified. It is difﬁcult to see why the close dependants ofpersons who may be murdered, or otherwise die in consequence of a crime,
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should be excluded from the right to reasonable assistance. Such claims are
included in the Victorian and New Zealand legislation and in‘the United
Kingdom. It would of course follow that they should also be subject to the
upper limit and any award should be regarded as reasonable assistance only,
and no doubt the principles to be applied would be those used in assessing
damages under the Cbmpensation to Relatives Act. although I think that
provision should be made for regard to be had to the conduct of the
decetISed person. However, I am of the View that compensation for
bereavement, which has no part in the civil law, should not be inclu
ded in
any scheme relating to compensation for crimes. Although this may seem
hard-hearted I think it is difﬁcult to find any real justification for its
inclusion. ' .
Should not the order for compensation be made directly against the Crow
n
rather than, as at present, against the criminal? .,
Should the Crown in any event have a right of recourse?
I recognize at the outset that these are both matters upon which
differing views will undoubtedly be held. After reflection I have c
ome to
the conclusion that it is probably preferable for provision to be ma
de that
public moneys should constitute the primary fund to which recour
se may
be had because it' appears to be quite unreal, in the light of experien
ce here
and in England as disclosed by the figures in the present paper, t
o make
orders against offenders and then, so far as New South Wales is con
cerned,
to be required to go in almost all cases to the Under Secretary
under the
.1967 legislation. It is now necessary to distinguish between case
s where an
order has been made under either 5. 437 or s. 554 (and this is dea
lt with
in s. 3 of the 1967 Act) and those cases for'which s. 4 provide
s together
With other cases where a crime has undoubtedly been committed
but no
offender has been apprehended. It seems to me desirable to eradicate the
.need for any such distinction between s. 3 and s. 4' of the 1967 Act and
to simplify the procedures involved .by adopting the English pr
ovisions
which permit recourse to be had in the first instance against publ
ic moneys.
The English scheme provides that any payment shall be ex grati
a, as now
does 5. 5 of our Act, whereas in New Zealand the victim is empow
ered to
claim as of right. Although it probably does not matter greatly, I
incline to
the view that where ‘the scheme is set up by legislation (which
it is not in
England), and if recourse is to be given directly against a fund, i
t would be
preferable for any payment not to be ex gratia but made.as of right
and
according 'to the application of well established principles.
I think that the
right should extend not only to those who are injured or
to the close
dependants of those who are killed, in cases where the
injury or death
results from a crime in respect of which a person is convicted
, but should
extend to those cases where a crime has certainly been commi
tted but no
offender is apprehended, or. where he may be acquitted on
grounds of
mental illness or perhaps on some other similar but limited class of groun
ds,
and also the case where an alleged offender is found not to be fi
t to plead.
In relation to the question of whether or not there should b
e a right
of recovery over against the offender l differ, and again wit
h hesitation,
from the views of the author of the paper which he expre
ssed as being -
 78
somewhat tentative. I see no reason why, even giving full weight to the fact
that the provisions are not intended as punishment but as compensation, anoffender who is financially able to do so should not bear the ultimate
burden of compensation awarded. The injured person is entitled to sue himin most cases for the commission of a tort and, provided he is given credit
for any sum in respect of which he is liable to indemnify the fund, I see
little reason why he should not be required to pay in full the damage
suffered by the victim. In this respect he should be in no different
situation, in my view, from a tortfeasor, although I recognize that in many
cases the latter would be covered by insurance. .I see no reason why the
public purse should bear ‘the ultimate burden of compensation paid, inrespeCt of criminal conduct, by persons who may well be able to afford tobear that burden themselves. Once again I recognize that the cases in which
there will be recovery, at least in full, may be small in number but I donot think that that is any reason for abolishing the right of recourse. I donot suggest that such right should exist merely to give “the principle ofpersonal reparation by the offender a more prominent place in thepenal system" — to quote from the report of the Advisory Council on thePenal System which reported to the United Kingdom Government in 1970‘upon that very matter. However, it is my view that if the offender wasabsolved from the requirement that he should reimburse the fund forpayments made, too much regard would be paid to the so-called rights, or
the rehabilitation, of the criminal, and not enough to the rights of"‘-thepublic which would otherwise have to bear the burden of the compensation.
ln saying that I think the right of recovery should be retained l amstrongly of the view that there should be a wide discretion conferred as tothe cases in which steps should be taken to recover compensation paid,either wholly or in part, and the terms upon which payment will berequired to be made. The only consequence would be that, to the extent ofthe compensation paid, the right to sue civilly would be transferred fromthe victim to the fund and I see no inconsistency between this notion andthe' principle that compensation is not intended to punish the offender. Thesame rules are clearly laid down in relation to most cases where damages
are claimed in civil proceedings. 1 agree however, that in no circumstances
should failure to pay result in a period of imprisonment, as in the case of
non-payment of a fine.
The Tribunal
This is perhaps one of the most important aspects of the paper underconsideration and it is a matter where in my opinion alterations to theexisting practice and procedure are desirable. As is pointed out, applicationsat the present time may come before the judge who presided at thecriminal trial, or before some other judge, or the Under Secretary ofJustice. So far as the judge who presided at the trial is concerned, it isclear that very little of the evidence at such trial will have any bearingupon the amount of compensation which he should award. Only rarely isthe full extent of the injuries of the victim relevant. and in most cases it ishighly prejudicial. The victim is not a party, and is not entitled to berepresented, and the issues at the trial are entirely different in the mainfrom those which are relevant to any claim for compensation. A number of
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the authorities indicate that an application for compensation should be
based upon the evidence given at the trial. but whether or not this is
correct it should be made clear,‘in my opinion, whether the ultimate
tribunal is a Special one or remains as at present, that additional eviden
ce
may be given either orally or upon affidavit.
I think there is much to be said for, the view that a special tribunal
should deal with all claims: This would relieve the Under Secretary of the
Very onerous task which he has, and which I know he perform
s with care,
sympathy and diligence, and it would also have the effect of standa
rdizing
awards as between various judges. I think there is much to be
said.for a
tribunal such as exists in England or in New Zealand, neither of
which are
strictly bound by rules of evidence, and I would suggest for co
nsideration
that a retired judge be appointed, either alone or with one
or more
part-time assistants, to constitute such tribunal. I do
not advocate the
completely informal and private type of procedure which i
s followed in
England. I think that the tribunal should have the power to dire
ct that the
identity of the applicant should not be disclosed, but I am
somewhat
against permitting the whole of the proceedings to be in
private. I think
also that evidence by afﬁdavit or orally, on oath, should
be given in a
reasonably formal manner and the tribunal should where
necessary be
assisted by a lawyer in order that the 'claims may be approp
riately pr'obed.
The examples given by Mr Downs in his paper show clearl
y a need to
probe many of the claims that are made. I also consider
the applicant
should have legal representation and no doubt the legal aid f
unds could be
extended to apply to such applications. Such a scheme will mea
n that the
tribunal would be required to read the transcript of the tr
ial, where there
has been one in order to take into account the conduct
of the victim and
any other relevant matters, but this should «not present any
problem. I am
reluctant to suggest that, at a time when boards and
tribunals and
committees appear to be the order of the day, especially
at the behest of
the Australian Government, there should be yet another tri
bunal appointed,
but I think that the matter is sufficiently important to war
rant the setting
up of a special body and I would support the recommendat
ion which has
been made in this paper. I do not think that there shou
ld be any appeal
from such a tribunal. Although perhaps consideration c
ould be given to the
making of interim orders in exceptional cases, I t
hink that where there is to
be a trial this should normally take place before an
y payments out are
made. It may be that the alleged offender is acquit
ted and that in
consequence the case will be one where an order sho
uld not be made. I
should emphasize that the views which I have expressed
are derived in no
way from any dissatisfaction with the manner in which
the present scheme
has been administered but I do think! there is much to
be said, especially if
there is to be a fund to which resort may in the first
instance be had, for
directing all claims for compensation to a single tribuna
l such as has been
suggested. ,
Whatever may be the deficiencies of the existing schem
e, and whether
or not any of the recommendations which are su
ggested are adopted
thereafter, I would record my very firm view that the
scheme as it now
exists is far preferable from many points of vi
ew to that which is
contemplated by the National Compensation Scheme wh
ich has already been
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discussed this evening. Much of the philosophy behind that bill I find~repugnant; it encourages far too much reliance to be placed upon the Stateas the hander-out of all things that are good; it will result in a giant. bureaucracy which may be less of a problem in a place like New ZealandbUt which in this country inmy opinion will result in tremendousadministrative problems and bungling; the cost will undoubtedly be quiteastronomical and the scheme as at present framed has very considerableanomalies. I can only hope that in its present form at least it will never seethe light of. day.
-
I have done little more than reiterate the views of the author of thepaper in most cases but I would commend the suggestions which he hasmade and, with some hesitation, the views which I have expressed to theconsideration of those who have already, since the passing of the 1967legislation, demonstrated their interest in and deep concern with theproblem which we are discussing.
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REPORT ON 1974 BUDAPEST CONFERENCE
0. M. Healey, LLB.
In September, 1974, I attended the Xlth Internation
al Congress of
Penal Law held at Budapest. The papers mainly attrac
ting my interest were
[Itﬁﬁe delivered on the subject of compensation of
the victims, of criminal
acts. My interest in the subject arose out of three
cases dealt with in my
office in recent years and it may be of some int
erest to make reference to
those cases. The first case arose in 1971 when
the client in question
attempted to prevent an armed robbery and was a
ssaulted. The offenders
were charged in connection with the robbery but
not in connection with
the assault. After 2 years of correspondence and d
ocumentation an ex gratia
payment of $2,000 was made. The second
case arose out of an event in
1972 when damages amounting to $4,000 wer
e ordered against two
defendants. These damages were paid from cons
olidated revenue following
an application under s. 5 (1) of the Criminal
Injuries Compensation Act
1967. In the third base the offence. took
place in November,'1973 when
the client lost an eye 'when the offender dis
charged an air rifle! The
offender was dealt with in the Children’s Cour
t with-a result that the
magistrate had no jurisdictién to make an Order.
In due course an ex gratia
payment of $1,750 was made and receive
d on the 3rd March, 1975. The
medical expenses of the victim were conside
rable and are still being
incurred. ‘
In none of the above cases did the amount of co
mpensation obtained
approach in any real degree the quantum of
compensation customary in
jury verdicts for injured workers. You will
see that two of the cases
depended upon the ex gratia provisions of th
e legislation and although the
victims were grateful for the existence of suc
h provisions the need to rely
on the same for compensation points up the in
adequacy of the entitlements
of victims under the existing legislation. Th
e congress dealt with the
question of ex gratia payments and later in
this paper I will quote the
resolution of the congress on this aspect.
The participants in the congress were armed
with a bulletin of the '
International Association of Penal. Law conta
ining the papers presented at'
'the preparatory colloquium in Freiburg in'
October, 1973. .Sixteen national
reports are contained in the bulletin cove
ring more than 400 pages and
including resolutions. These papers and resolu
tions formed .the basis of the
discussions and the determinations of 't
he _'congress. The bulletin presents an
important document for any legislative .bo
dy dealing with the subject of
compensation of victims of crime. I h
ave extracted the bulletin and, as a
great deal of it is in French, I have liberall
y quoted from the general report
prepared by Dr Jacob van Bemmelen.
A paper was presented by Dr Scha
fer of the United States, a well-
known author on the subject. Ur Se
nater favoured a system of
compensation by the State but'in doin
g so he distinguished. between
compensation and restitution. The compen
sation is destined to indemnify
the victim for the damage or the injury suf
fered by him and caused by the
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act of the offender. it is an indication- of gthe responsibility assumed bysociety." According to Schafer the compensation has a civil or neutralcharacter and has a non-criminal character in the criminal procedure.Restitution on the other hand “allocates the responsibility to the offender.The restoration or reparation of the victim’s position and rights that weredamaged or destroyed by the criminal attack become, in effect, a part ofthe offender’s sentence. It is a claim for restitutive action to be taken bythe criminal and is, in essence, penal in character and thus represents acorrectional goal in a criminal process”. The final paragraphs of Schafer’sreport are as follows: ‘ ' -
(5/ Restitution should be collected in the same way as taxesfand
should be deducted from earnings by the criminal's employer. or
collected by the tax office from the criminal’s income and paid
to the victim by the latter. lf restitution is not recoverable
because the- offender has insufficient means, it should not be
able to be commuted to any other kind of penalty. ‘
‘(6/ -- With the aid of fines or. other sources of revenue, the State
.shouki set up a Compensation Fund, and victims should be
compensated from that where the total amount of restitution
_ turns out to be irrecoverable, or if the offender is not known.
‘ . An' extensive and comparative report was presented by Burns and Rossof Canada and it is interesting to note from the final paragraph of theirreport that‘they were aware of the-development in New Zealand followingthe Woodhouse report and l quote: '
On a more general plane, it is suggested that the creation ofcrime-victim indemnification schemes is merely one facet of a
. soda-economic trend that is reﬂected in the Canadian provinces. This isbasically" the removal of the common law action, wedded as it is tothe concept of fault-liability, in favour of “state insurance." schemes
that. marshal resources and allocate them according to social andeconomic policies set up by the state itself. ...... The logicalconclusion of this trend. assuming economic feasibility, is the creation,of, d (comprehensive scheme embracing state compensation to itscitizens: for any personal injuries suffered, whether on the highway, atwork' o'r elsewhere, and regardless of the cause.
A footnote makes reference to the WoodhouselReport and a further footnote adds
Only in the case of self-inflicted injuries would a difficult policyquestion be involved. Although even here, since the financial. consequences to the victim and his dependants would be the same, itcould be argued that compensation should be awarded and relianceplaced on a separate criminal sanction as a deterrent.
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The congress was well attended by the Eastern European countries.
Most of the reports from those countries were similar in content in that the
representatives indicated that their Social Security Services were sufficient to
compensate the victim with the offender making restitution to the State.
However, it was obvious that the type of compensation did not approach
that proposed by our National Compensation Bill and that thecountries in
question did pursue the matter of restitution by the offender to the State.
Dr van Bemmelen drew special attention to the‘report of the
Representatives of the German Democratic Republic by Professors Luther
and Weber. The report featured three aspects of compensation for victims
of crime. The first of these relates to social insurance beneﬁts and I quote:
the social insurance-scheme covers all expenses that might be
connected with bodily injury. All working people and the members of
their family enjoy free medical care etc. and in cases of invalidity
they receive pensions. The same is true for persons attending primary
and secondary schools and staying at holiday homes. Special
protection is given to citizens against acts of violence and more in
particular to persons helping to defend others against those acts:
Persons helping to safeguard security and keep order on an unsalaried
basis, e.g., voluntary police helpers, lay assessors and members of
social courts are also covered by social insurance.
To the extent that social insurance leaves the injured party insufficiently
covered then the loss is suffered by the injured party who in some cases
has to bear a large part of the damage sustained.
The second aspect of the German Democratic Republic System is
contained in the 1968 Penal Code in provisions enabling the court trying
Criminal offences to rule on damages payable by the culprit to the victim.
But that compensation is not the only aim. One wants at the
same time to make the culprit aware of his material obligations and
to present a clear picture of the full extent of his offence to the
public.
The third aspect of the system dealt with by the report of Luther and
Weber concerns the possibility of altering probation or giving a conditional
sentence providing 'as a condition the indemniﬁcation of the victim. '
Many of the Eastern European representatives argued against the
institution of a Special fund for compensation for victims of crime the main
argument being that there is no sufficient reason to_treat damages caused
by an offence differently from damages resulting from accidents, illnesses,
risks of labour, forced strikes, cataclysms, etc. On the otherhand
Professor '
Hulsman of Rotterdam University pointed out that a special fund in fav
our
of the victims of offences not only served to indemnify the victim but also
helped to regularize the conflict between the offender and his victim.
At
the same time it would give an opportunity to the culprit to reimbu
rse to
that fund his debt in successive part payments.
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The statement by 'Dimitrui' of Romania when referring to the
obligatory insurance in respect of motor vehicles is noteworthy for the
method of expression when he says:
The more the system of insurances develops, .the less the rules
of civil responsibility will be applied. Evidently this will not remain
without consequenc‘es- with regard. to the theory of law. The central
point of discussion is shifting. The problem of the correlation between
culpable resptmsibility and the responsibility without culpability
3 becomes blurred. More and more the idea of the guarantee of risks
comes to the foreground.
This guarantee is related to compensation for criminal injury and the
Hungarian representatives‘indicated that the system of insurance existing in
that Country offered a guarantee to the victim of an offence as large asis
economically possible. ,
I noted with interest (and this was made the subject of a resolution
of the congress) that the penal code of the German Democratic Republic
prescribes that the damage for a victim was to be assessed not later than
the Opening of the trial, that is before the order committing the accused
for trial is issued. - ,. , . -, . .
The Econgress accepted and has published the following conclusions:
COMPENSATION FOR THE 'VlCTlM.FROM PUBLIC FUNDS
(l) The majority of‘ the participants of the congress recommend that
V the primary compensation for a victim of a crime should be
made from public funds by the State or some other public
institution. The decision whether such compensation should be
administered by a legally independent fund, a special
compensation board, through existing social Welfare or'social
insurance agency, should be left to the various legislators.
The minority of the participants favour compensation from
public funds but recommend that such compensation should
' occupy only a subsidiary position leaving primary responsibility
with the offender.
Some participants ,do not favour the creation of public
compensation arrangements, believing either that existing
institutions are adequate, or that public compensation fails of its
~ object of criminal policy.
 ..
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(2) The supporters of the compensation for the victim from public
funds recommend the consideration of the following principles
by the legislator in constructing this new institution:
" (a)
(b)
(C)
(d)
(e)
(f) .
(3)
Compensation should cover at least damage caused by
intentional crimes against life and limb. Compensation for
the victim of a crime against property should be paid only ~
in particularly serious cases when ' lack of such
compensation would be intolerable for the victim.
The immediate victim of the crime should be entitled to
compensation. In addition, those dependants should be
entitled to compensation whose supportthas been affected ,
by the crime.
Compensation should be a legal right as opposed to an ex
gratia act. , '
If the compensation is paid by a government body or
public institution, the claim is transferred ‘ to the
latter/cessr'o legis/. In the enforcement of this claim against
the offender the principles of modern criminal policy must
also be taken into consideration (resocialisation of the
convict, protection of the. economically weak offender).
Apart from other sources the public fund for compensation
should also be drawn from tax revenues.
The decision whether 'the compensation should beiawarded
by a‘ judicial or an administrative proceeding has to be left
to the national legislator. Similarly, it has to be left to the
national legislator whether the criminal court judge should
be empowered to decide on the possibility or necessity of
a compensation for the victim from public funds, in the
course of his adjudication over the criminal act itself.
Finally, it should be left to the national legislator whether
the prosecutor should be entitled to claim the
compensation for the victim from public funds. '
Foreign nationals who, within the country (or on a vessel
-or’ aircraft of the country), fall victim to a crime should be ‘
compensated according‘to the same principles as citizens,
regardless whether the foreigners’ own ‘State would grant
reciprocity. ' ' '
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COMPENSATING THE VICTIM WITHIN THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
(I) The majority of the participants’ of the congress favour the
adhesion process in which the claim of the victim for
compensation can be enforced within the criminal proceeding,
admitting however that this process may have certain
disadvantages. -
(2) In the regulation of this process the national legislator should
take into consideration the following principles:
A (a)
' , (b)
"(0)
(d)
'-' :(e)
(f)
(g)
The victim must have the right to choose between an
ordinary civil proceeding and the adhesion process.
The adhesion process must necessarily be a mixed structure
of civil and criminal procedural elements.
It should be left to the national legislator to‘ decide
whether the adhesion process might be instituted, in
addition to the victim,‘by the prosecutor. The same applies
to the question whether the court might award a
compensation'for the victim ex officio.
The procedural rights of the victim in the adhesion process
must include at least'the right to adducevevidence (also
regarding the criminal case) and the right to appeal (at
least as regards the decision on. the compensation claim).
The accused must have the same procedural rights as the
complainant. '
The obligation of the criminal court to decide on the civil
claim remained controverted. It was recommended,
however, that the adhesion process should be restricted to
a decision on whether the claim was justified, when the
decision as to the amount of compensation would be left
to the appropriate civil court or to a subsequent special
criminal procedure. '
Execution in advance of the decision on the compensation
claim must be ensured in order to provide the victim his
remedy as rapidly as possible.
The judgment of a criminal court. awarding civil
compensation in the adhesion process should have the same ‘
status as the corresponding decision of a civil court for the
purpose of foreign execution. ' ' " '
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PROMOTING VlC’llM (fflMi'lzNSA'l'lf)N THROUGH OTHER
MEANS
Indirect measures for victim compensation:
(I) Compensation as a precondition or decision
in the conditional
‘ suspension of the penal procedure or of the executio
n of the
penalty, in probation or conditional release, taking how
ever into
consideration the economic situation of the off
ender;
(2) Consideration of a full or feasible compen
sation in punishment,
clemency or, rehabilitation.
Conclusion
It is easy to conclude that the legislation in New
South Wales and
other States is insufficient although some may argue
that at least on a State
level the New South Wales legislation is working and
is as much as can be
afforded at this time. It comes to mind that the ex
istence and publication
of improved compensation provisions might mean th
at more crimes may be
reported by the victims. 1f the National Compensati
on Bill becomes law it
would be important to see that the sense of respons
ibility of the offenders
is not reduced and that the desirability or otherwise
of restitution by the
offender is fully'explored. One noteS'with interest fro
m Mr Downs paper
the extent to which the New South Wales Gov
ernment recovers its
compensation moneys from offenders. Apart from
the comments of the
Canadian representatives, the type of compensation
for victims of crime
possible under our National Compensation Bill woul
d have been a
revolutionary concept to most participants in th
e congress. Many of the
commentators at the congress favoured limited' compensati
on schemes and
indicated that the extent of the schemes would be
affected by the funding
capacities of the countries. Certainly the possibility
recognized by clause 13
of the bill that an offender might also be a claima
nt would be a surprise
and a novelty as indeed it is to me. Most of
those addressing the
Convention emphasized the needgfor restitution by th
e offender and the
involvement by the offender in paying his:deb
ts to the State and to the
Victim.
Apart from the constitutional difficul
ties mentioned by Mr Herron in
his paper the cost figures quoted by
Mr Herron may well be a deterrent t
o
the passage of the bill through the
gSenate 'and it is obvious that the
same
‘factor would deter countries
throughout the world from sim
ilar legislation
even if it is restricted in limited form
to compensation for the victims of
crimes. 1 would hope that if the N
ational Compensation Bill is shelve
d the
matter of compensating victims of
crime would be the subject of sep
arate
legislation by the Australian Govern
ment whereby the Government assu
mes
the responsibility of compensating
the victim without necessarily invo
lvmg
the victim in litigation and wher
eby the Australian Government in
turn
takes the type of action now taken
under the New South Wales legislat
ion
to obtain some restitution from the o
ffender.
'xx
'- * PRESENTATION or REPORT
0. M. Healey, LLB.
In the time available it is not possible to condense the 450 pages of
the bulletin handed to us at the International Congress on Penal Law at
Budapest last year. I will try and pick the meat out of the goulash.
'First of all I would like to mention the matter of ex gratia payments
which I personally consider to be unsatisfactory under the present system
although I concede that we do need those provisions because the present
legislation as such does not give sufficient entitlement. It is very difficult
when your clients give you their problems to pursue and you cannot tell
them that they have a real entitlement but that it is an ex gratia matter.
This matter was dealt with quite at length in the congress.
The two basic questions considered at the congress were:
0 Is it desirable or. even necessary to establish a public institution
which provides a compensation by the State to victims of crimes
with the aid' of public funds?, and
Q Is it desirable that the. criminal judge either at the request of
the victim or of his own accord has the power or even the
obligation to condemn the culprit to restitute the loss suffered
by the victim cf the crime?
it might surprise you that jurists from all over the world doubted to some
extent whether it was necessary to create a public institution. To quote
from one author:
There is no sufficient reason to treat damages caused by an
offence differently from prejudices resulting from accidents, illnesses,
risks of labour, forced strikes, cataclysms etc.
In the course of my consideration of the bulletin one of the principal
matters for consideration was whether a special fund is required or whether
victims are to be compensated within thefield. of social services, e.g.,
invalid pensions etc. If we say that that is insufficient and that we ought to
create a special fund, and have. special legislation as we have in New South
Wales, then we must recognize that we create all sorts of difficulties. We
have .to consider the type of compensation and the administration of it
, through the courts or through departments. We have to consider matters of
. restitution and the administration of restitution. We have to consider what
_crirninal acts are going to come within the concept of the legislation. We
have“ to consider the, eligibility ‘of the victims knowing that there are
' problems of contributory behaviour and that there are shaded areas where it
is difficult to determine whether the injury results from an accident or
from a criminal act. Lastly, but not least, and this concerned a great
number of the authors of papers at the congress, we have to consider the
extent of the compensation. The cost factor seemed to be very much a
matter of concern to the authors at the congress.
 ‘
.
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Dr Schafer emphasized restitution". I will not offer an opinion. There
are arguments for and'against and I think that if we have our National
Compensation Bill brought into legal effect 'we can perhaps continue those
arguments, and they will no doubt be continued in the light of the
application of the sections of the Act in the compensation divisions. A lot
of the authors, particularly those from‘_ the Eastern European countries,
Wdhléd to involve the criminal or the offender with the victim by way of
compensation and one speaker even thought that they should be brought
together to try and achieve some balance, som rectification of the social
relationship between them as individuals but this seemed to be too extreme
to most of us.
I have emphasized this matter of restitution because it was emphasized
at the congress and certainly does not appear in our National Compensation
Bill.
I particularly commend the comparative report of Burns and Ross of
Canada. They were the only authors who to any great extent, seemed to
me to come to a conclusion that in the ultimate a guarantee system of
compensation is what is needed. [go on to speak of the attitudes of. the
Eastern EurOpean countries. Most of those countries seem to represent that
their systems were all that was needed and were working well. But the
systems mainly appear to have the types of social security beneﬁts which
we are already accustomed to in our own system, coupled with the right of
the victim to pursue compensation‘against the offender through the courts.
The conclusions accepted by the congress ’are reproduced in my paper.
, My own conclusions simply are that if our National Compensation Bill
is passed I think we should take into account the views of these learned
‘jurists and keep before us whether the provisions of the bill reduce the
senSe of responsibility of the offenders. i believe that we should consider
seriously matters like restitution. Whether we accept it or not is another
thing but we ought‘to seriously consider it. If the bill is not passed we
should press for a National Act limited to the field of compensation for
criminal injury. ' '
If neither of those objectsris achieved then at least, in my limited
eitperience, the New South Wales Act needs'to be considerably reviewed to
diminish the ex gratia provisions and to'i‘ncrease the entitlements which can
be pursued by lawyers on behalf of victims‘. I would commend the objective
comments and approaches of Mr Justice IsaaCS and Mr Justice Yeldham.
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